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SHOULD MississiPPi ADOPT A CLASS-ACTION RULEBALANCING THE EQUITIES: TEN CONSIDERATIONS
THAT MISSISSIPPI RULEMAKERS OUGHT TO TAKE
INTO ACCOUNT IN EVALUATING WHETHER

TO ADOPT A STATE CLASS-ACTION RULE
Linda S. Mullenix*
I.

INTRODUCTION

As is well-known, at least to state class action aficionados, Mississippi
is the only state in the Union that currently does not have a class-action
rule.' All forty-nine other states, even including the District of Columbiawhich is not even a state-have class-action rules.'
This places the state of Mississippi in the rather unique company of
Guam,3 the Northern Marianna Islands,4 the Virgin Islands,5 and Puerto
Rico:6 all jurisdictions and territories that (like Mississippi) lack their own
* Morris and Rita Atlas Chair in Advocacy, University of Texas School of Law.
1. See generally Linda S. Mullenix, STATE CLASS ACrIoNs: PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE (CCH
2000 with annual updates); USF&G Ins. Co. of Miss. v. Walls, 2004 WL 1276971 (Miss. June 10, 2004)
("We granted USF & G's petition for interlocutory appeal.., which asks one question: does Mississippi
recognize 'equitable class actions' in chancery, despite an omission of Rule 23 from our Rules of Civil
Procedure? After a review of the history of the law, we answer the question in the negative.").
2. Id. But see Richard T. Phillips, Class Actions & Joinderin Mississippi, 71 Miss. L.J. 447, 453
n.14 (2001) (suggesting that New Hampshire and Virginia also do not have class-action rules, but recognize equitable class actions in consumer litigation). The New Hampshire class-action rule is N.H.
SUPER. CT. R. 27-A (class actions). The New Hampshire courts have recognized that the provisions of
Rule 27-A are comparable to the provisions of Fed. R. Civ. P. 23. See Prive v. New Hampshire-Vermont
Health Servs., 1998 WL 375294 *1, *1 (N.H. Super. July 1, 1998). Virginia does not have a class-action
rule, but does permit litigants to pursue class relief in cases involving condominium, time-share, and
property association litigation. See LINDA S. MULLENIX, STATE CLASS ACTION PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE: Virginia § 1.01.
3. See, e.g., Abuan v. General Elec. Co., 735 F. Supp. 1479 (D. Guam 1990) (class action dismissed due to lack of personal jurisdiction over defendant corporation); Crain v. Gov. of Guam, 97 F.
Supp. 433 (D. Guam 1951) (class-action complaint dismissed because of court's lack of jurisdiction to
render declaratory judgment in controversy over tax issues).
4. See, e.g., Does I v. The Gap, Inc., 2003 WL 22997250 *1 (D.N. Mar. I. Sept. 11, 2003) (order
regarding plaintiffs' application for award of attorney fees and costs in class-action settlement); Does I
v. The Gap, Inc., 2002 WL 1000073 (D.N. Mar. I. May 10, 2002) (motion for class certification granted
for class challenging garment production system on Saipan, on behalf of Saipan garment factor workers); Osilek v. Commonwealth Util. Corp., 1993 WL 268635 *1 (D.N. Mar. I. 1993) (class certification
granted to injunctive relief class of utility customers).
5. See, e.g., Hall v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., 340 F. Supp. 2d 596 (D.V.I. 2004) (class action alleging
breach of contract, fraud, misrepresentation, and deceit); Charleswell v. Chase Manhattan Bank, N.A.,
223 F.R.D. 371 (D.V.I. 2004) (class certification denied to class of mortgagors against banks alleging
defendants filed to provide adequate hazard insurance coverage); Chiang v. Veneman, 213 F.R.D. 256
(D.V.I. 2003) (class certification granted; class alleged Rural Housing Service discriminated against
plaintiffs based on race, gender, and national origin).
6. See, e.g., Collazo v. Calderon, 212 F.R.D. 437 (D.P.R. 2002) (class certification denied in
employment discrimination case); Rivera v. Am. Home Prods. Corp., 191 F.R.D. 45 (D.P.R. 1999)
(class certification denied for lack of typicality in proposed ERISA class action); Barreras Ruiz v. Am.
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class-action rule, but nonetheless are subject to the federal class-action
rule.7 It may come as some surprise to learn that one can indeed pursue
class-action litigation in Guam, the Northern Mariannas, the Virgin Islands,
and Puerto Rico, but for the litigious-minded, it also may be some comfort
to know that the sun apparently never sets on the American class-action
landscape.
It also is somewhat of a misconception to say that Mississippi does not
have class-action litigation, because it does. Both the Northern8 and
Southern9 federal district courts of Mississippi entertain robust class-action
practice under Federal Rule 23. Furthermore, the subject matter of Mississippi federal class actions tracks the categories of class actions that one

encounters throughout the federal and state court systems.
Thus, in Mississippi federal courts since the year 2000, one may find
reported class-action cases alleging violations of federal constitutional
rights, such as violation of the Eighth Amendment;1 ° race-based discrimifednation in educational opportunities; 1 as well as violations of various
12
eral statutes, such as the Federal Debt Collection Practice Act.
Mississippi federal class actions, however, are not limited to claims
arising under the federal court's federal question jurisdiction;1 3 the Mississippi federal courts also have entertained diversity-based 4 class actions
based on state substantive law. 5 For example, the Mississippi federal
courts since the year 2000 have considered proposed class actions alleging
claims sounding in groundwater contamination and damage to real and
personal property;16 breach of the common law duty of good faith and fair
dealing;" common law fraud and equitable restitution;1 8 and property
Tobacco Co., 180 F.R.D. 194 (D.P.R. 1999) (class certification denied due to lack of commonality,
adequacy, predominance and superiority).
7. FED. R. Civ. P. 23.
8. See, e.g., Batchelder v. Kerr-McGee Corp., 246 F. Supp. 2d 525 (N.D. Miss. 2003) (approval
of class-action settlement in groundwater contamination case); Russell v. Johnson, 2003 WL 22208029
*1 (N.D. Miss. May 21, 2003) (certifying class in prisoners' rights litigation); Ayers v. Musgrove, 2002
WL 91895 *1 (N.D. Miss. Jan. 2, 2002) (rulings relating to proposed class-action settlement regarding
race discrimination and denial of equal educational opportunities); Lyles v. Rosenfeld Attorney Network, 2000 WL 798824 *1 (N.D. Miss. May 17, 2000) (class certification denied in Fair Debt Collection
Practice Act case); Hill v. Telecom, L.P., 2000 WL 264325 *1 (N.D. Miss. Mar. 2, 2000) (class not
decertified as to remaining claims not dismissed on summary judgment (breach of duty of good faith
and fair dealing in cable provider billing)); Walton v. Franklin Collection Agency Inc., 190 F.R.D. 404
(N.D. Miss. 2000) (class certification granted in action against debt collection agency for fraud, abuse of
process, and violations of the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act).
9. Johnson v. Kansas City S., 224 F.R.D. 382 (S.D. Miss. 2004) (class certification denied in
proposed class action against telecommunications providers for improper installation of fiber optic
cable on private property); Keyes v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am., 194 F.R.D. 253 (S.D. Miss. 2000)
(class certification denied in "vanishing premium" litigation).
10. Russell, 2003 WL 22208029 at *5.
11. Ayers, 2002 WL 91895 at *1.
12. Lyles, 2000 WL 798824 at *1.
13. See 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (federal question jurisdiction).
14. See 28 U.S.C. § 1332 (federal diversity jurisdiction).
15. Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
16. Batchelder, 246 F. Supp. 2d at 526-27.
17. Hill, 2000 WL 264325 at *3.
18. Keyes, 194 F.R.D. at 254.
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rights and conveyances. t9 These lists are by no means comprehensive of all
class-action litigation either filed or settled in Mississippi federal courts,2 °
but the list sufficiently demonstrates the gamut of class-action litigation extant in the state of Mississippi.
In June 2004, the Mississippi Supreme Court definitely answered the
question whether Mississippi state courts may entertain class actions, concluding that the Court had not enacted a rule providing for class actions in
chancery, circuit court, or otherwise.2 1 It might be surprising for non-Mississippians to learn that whether Mississippi courts ever had a class-action
rule-or could entertain class actions in equity court-was an uncertain
and confused proposition for nearly three decades, or since 1982, when
Mississippi enacted its modern rules of civil procedure.
As a consequence of this doctrinal muddle, Mississippi also has been
engaged in a longstanding debate on whether it should adopt a class-action
rule-reflected in judicial opinions-which apparently reached crisis stage
last spring. In June 2004, Judge Easley, dissenting in Janssen
Pharmaceuticav. Bailey, suggested that Mississippi should set up a commission to study promulgation of a state class-action rule.2 2 Before embarking
19. Johnson, 224 F.R.D. at 383-84.
20. It is difficult to generalize about class-action litigation based on reported court decisions. As
an empirical evidence matter, it is extremely difficult to collect data on class-action practice within
either the state or federal court systems because of a lack of recording systems that track types of cases
or their disposition. Many, if not most, court systems do not separately track class-action filings.
Hence, reported class-action decisions represent only a fraction of class-action litigation; many classaction cases that are filed may be dismissed, non-suited, denied certification without a reported court
order, granted certification without a reported court order, or settled without a reported court order.
In other words, the resolution of many class actions leaves no traceable record in the reported universe
of court decisions.
This problem was recognized more than a decade ago by Professor Guthrie T. Abbott, who, in
researching an article about the growing incidence of mass-tort litigation, began his article by noting:
This article will address the present status of complex or mass tort litigation in state courts in
Mississippi and suggest some areas of concern as well as some additions or amendments to
procedural rules and statutes which might help the courts manage such controversies. The
presence of mass tort litigation is apparent to anyone who regularly reads a newspaper. There
is great public interest in the legal maneuvering involved in claims for damages based upon
matters such as exposure to asbestos, dioxin or problems resulting from breast implants. The
authors' interest in this topic was spurred by newspaper and magazine reports of the growing
number of legal controversies which involve large numbers of parties with claims which are
related in some manner. However, beginning the research for this article revealed a problem
which needs to be, and apparently is being remedied. There was no source available to determine how many lawsuits or collections of pending suits in Mississippi state courts might be
classified as complex or mass tort matters.
See Guthrie T. Abbott & Pope Mallette, Complex/Mass Tort Litigation in State Courts in Mississippi,63
Miss. L.J. 363, 363 (1994).
21. USF&G Ins. Co., 2004 WL 1276971 at *5.
22. See Janssen Pharm., Inc. v. Bailey, 878 So.2d 31, 64 (Miss. 2004) (Easley, J., dissenting) ("As
this decision leaves too many questions unanswered, I must respectfully dissent. M.R.C.P. 20 is intended to streamline cases and to promote judicial economy. Armond and this case create further
problems which will ultimately impact Mississippi by clogging our court systems, strain our judicial staff
and resources, and place added cost and burden on the taxpayer by increasing the litigation and subsequent court costs. In my opinion, this Court needs to take a more thorough look at this troubling
situation, consider setting up a special committee to address the situation and seriously consider and
investigate the alternative of implementing class actions in Mississippi, possibly following the federal
court model set out in F.R.C.P. 23.").
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on rule reform, it is worthwhile briefly to consider Mississippi's historical,
existential class-action crisis as a starting point for understanding how Mississippi has reached its own peculiar class-action predicament in 2004.
II.

DID

Mississippi

EVER HAVE A CLASS-ACTION RULE?

It is well known that when Mississippi adopted its rules of civil procedure, the rulemakers deliberately omitted a class-action rule. 3 Thus, the
current Mississippi Rules of Civil Procedure continue to lack a formal
class-action rule.2 4 At the time the Mississippi Rules of Civil Procedure
were adopted, the Official Comments to the Rules stated: "Class action5
2
practice is not being introduced into Mississippi trial courts at this time.
On the law side of the judicial system, then, class actions were not and have
not been cognizable in Mississippi since the promulgation of the Mississippi
Rules of Civil Procedure. 6
However, the ability to pursue classwide litigation in Mississippi, at
least until Spring 2004, was possible through at least three alternative
means. Thus, in absence of a formal class-action rule, Mississippi actually
has entertained (and resolved) pseudo-class actions through other mechanisms, until the Mississippi Supreme Court definitively put a stop to these
practices.2 7
First, in the aftermath of promulgating modern procedural rules patterned on the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Mississippi courts retained
equity jurisdiction through its chancery courts. Because the Mississippi
rulemakers did not abolish the chancery courts, these courts could handle
equitable class actions through the equitable "bill of peace. '2 For many
years Mississippi courts have maintained and resolved equitable class actions through the bill of peace.29 Moreover, the Mississippi Code provides
for recovery of costs and attorneys' fees in equitable class actions.3 °
Indeed, this Mississippi practice mimicked federal court practice prior
to 1938, when Congress promulgated the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
In pre-1938 federal practice, litigants could pursue a prototype of the modern class action through the "equitable bill of peace."' 31 The Advisory
23. See Phillips, supra note 2, at 453; Marx v. Broome, 632 So. 2d 1315, 1322 (Miss. 1994) (noting
that the Mississippi Supreme Court deliberately omitted Rule 23 when promulgating the Mississippi
Rules of Civil Procedure).
24. See generally Miss. R. Civ. P.
25. Marx, 632 So. 2d at 1322.
26. Janssen Pharm., Inc., 878 So. 2d at 31.
27. See id.
28. See Thomas D. Rowe Jr., A Distant Mirror: The Bill of Peace in Early American Mass Torts
and its Implicationsfor Modem Class Actions, 39 ARIz. L. REV. 711 (1997) (discussing the equitable bill
of peace as the historical precursor of the modern American class action); Richard T. Phillips, supra,
note 2 at 459; 7A CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT, ARTHUR R. MILLER
TICE AND PROCEDURE: CIVIL 2D § 1751 (1986).

29.
consumer
mitted in
30.
31.

&

MARY KAY KANE, FEDERAL PRAC-

Am. Bankers Ins. Co. of Fla. v. Booth, 830 So. 2d 1205 (Miss. 2002) (allowing equitable
class action); Barrett v. Coullett, 263 So. 2d 764, 765 (Miss. 1972) (class-actions lawsuits perMississippi equity jurisdiction).
MIsS. CODE ANN. § 11-53-37 (1972); see also Phillips, supra note 2, at 458.
See WRIGHT, MILLER & KANE, supra note 28, § 1751.
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Committee Notes to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23 acknowledge the
equitable precursor to the federal class-action rule.32
Second, on the law side of the docket, Mississippi created pseudo-class

actions by permitting joinder of increasingly larger numbers of claimants
through the Mississippi joinder rules: Rules of Civil Procedure 20 and 42.
These rules, which substantially follow their federal counterparts for joinder of claims and consolidation of cases,3 4 permitted Mississippi courts to

aggregate large numbers of claims in a single action for common resolution.3 5 In recent years, and as a consequence of liberal application of the

joinder standards, the Mississippi courts have become magnet forums for
aggregating claims outside the formal requirements of a class-action rule.3 6

Indeed, Mississippi courts have enjoyed an almost "most favored nation" status among states regarding the ability to accomplish aggregate justice without the procedural requirements of a formalistic class-action rule.
Thus, both in-state and out-of-state plaintiffs' attorneys have flocked to
Mississippi in order to bring massive nationwide lawsuits against corporate
criticism of the exploitadefendants, 37 which in turn has inspired negative
38
tive nature of the Mississippi judicial system.

Third, Mississippi's most interesting class-action surrogate, in absence
of a formal rule, has been the use of harsh punitive damage awards against
corporate defendants in individual litigation.39 Thus, the Mississippi courts
32. See id. §§ 1751-152. Modern Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23 replaced former Equity
Rule 38 (1912-1938), which itself replaced former Equity Rule 48 (1842-1912). The modern Federal
Rule of Civil Procedure 23 permitts class actions both at law and at equity. See also John K. Rabiej,
The Making of Class Action Rule 23-What Were We Thinking?, 24 Miss. C.L. REV. 323, 325 (2005).
33. Richard T. Phillips, supra note 2, at 455-56; see also Miss. R. Civ. P. 20 and 42.
34. FED. R. Civ. P. 20 and 42.
35. Am. Bankers Ins. Co. of Fla. v. Booth, 830 So. 2d 1205, 1209 (Miss. 2002); Scordino v.
Hopeman Bros., Inc., 662 So. 2d 640 (Miss. 1995); Owens-Illinois v. Edwards, 573 So. 2d 704 (Miss.
1990); see also Guthrie T. Abbott & Pope S. Mallette, supra note 20, at 371-374; Richard T. Phillips,
supra note 2, at 456.
36. Richard T. Phillips, supra note 2, at 456-57; see, e.g., Mark Ballard, Mississippi Becomes a
Mecca for Tort Suits, NAT'L L.J., Apr. 30, 2001, at Al (discussing Jefferson County, Mississippi as a
magnet forum for plaintiffs forum-shopping for favorable jurisdictions); Robert Pear, Mississippi Gaining as Lawsuit Mecca, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 20, 2001, at Al (same); R. Brittain Virden, Tort Reform and the
MississippiConstitution of 1890, 63 Miss. L.J. 797 (Spring 1994) (discussing tort crisis in Mississippi as a
result of procedural and venue rules favoring aggregation of claims in plaintiff-favoring venues, with
large jury verdicts and high punitive damage awards).
37. See, e.g., Am. Bankers Ins. Co. of Fla. v. Alexander, 818 So. 2d 1073 (Miss. 2001); Walls v.
USF&G Co., (Civil Action No. B-99-07-272, Ch. Ct. Panola County, Miss. Nov. 15, 1999), cited in
Richard T. Phillips, supra note 2, at 459 and App. 2.
38. See, e.g., Mark A. Behrens & Cary Silverman, Now Open for Business: The Transformation
of Mississippi'sLegal Climate, 24 Miss. C.L. REV. 393 (2005); John W. Christopher, Tort Reform by the
Mississippi Supreme Court, 24 Miss. C. L. REV. 427 (2005); Tim Lemke, Lawyers in Paradise:Mississippi Has a Reputation as a Haven for Trial Lawyers Pursuing Mega-Lawsuits, Insight on the News,
Aug. 12, 2002, available at http://www.findarticles.com/p/articles/mi-m1571/is_29/18/ai_90439295; Jerry
Mitchell, Out-of-State Cases, In-State Headaches, CLARION-LEDGER (Jackson, Miss.), June 17, 2001, at
L.J. 343 (2001); see also articles cited supra
Al; Litigation in Mississippi Today, A Symposium, 71 MisI.
at note 36.
39. Phillips, supra note 2, at 455 ("The Mississippi experience has given rise to three alternative
strategies for handling 'class' and 'mass' litigation: . . . where all else fails, the prosecution of select
individual cases for punitive damages.").
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(and juries) embarked on a path of achieving pseudo-classwide justice
through a regime of imposing harsh punitive damage awards against badactor defendants in individual cases. By punishing corporate wrong-doers
harshly in individual litigation, Mississippi courts and juries have intended
to accomplish a deterrent effect with consequences for large numbers of
future claimants.4a Similar to permissive joinder, the availability and easy
certainty of large punitive damage awards turned Mississippi into a magnet
forum for aggregate litigation, in absence of a formal class-action rule.4 '
III.

THE ARGUMENTS FAVORING ADOPTION OF A CLASs-ACTION RULE

Mississippi decisional law regarding class-action litigation reflects a
lengthy struggle to accommodate the competing needs of an expanding
modern, industrial society-with concomitant large-scale legal problemswith a judicial code that expressly omits a procedural mechanism for
resolving aggregate claims on a classwide basis.
Hence, the Mississippi decisional law reflects a longstanding judicial
schizophrenia:42 on the one hand, Mississippi courts insist that the rules of
procedure do not provide for legal class actions; on the other hand, Mississippi courts permit equitable class actions, or pseudo-class actions, by way
of permissive joinder. In spring 2004, the Mississippi Supreme Court ended
this judicial confusion by declaring definitively that, in absence of a formal
class-action rule, Mississippi does not permit class actions at law, in equity,
or by permissive joinder. 3 Thus, in solving one longstanding crisis, the
Mississippi Supreme Court inspired another.
The Mississippi Supreme Court's declaration to the effect that Mississippi courts cannot entertain class actions has thus engendered the debate
whether Mississippi should now finally enact a formal class-action rule.
Proponents for the enactment of a class action-rule, including participants
of this symposium 44 and others, 45 easily can outline the arguments in support of promulgating and adopting a formal class-action rule.
Perhaps, first and foremost, the adoption of a formal class-action rule
would eliminate the backdoor bootstrapping of pseudo-class actions
through liberal application of the Mississippi joinder rules. This innovative
use of the Mississippi joinder rules has become the flashpoint for controversy over aggregate litigation in Mississippi state courts.
As others have pointed out, Mississippi courts have construed and applied the Mississippi joinder rules in a far more expansive manner than the
40. Id. at 459-61.
41. Id.
42. See generally Janssen Pharm., Inc. v. Bailey, 878 So.2d 31, 31 (Miss. 2004).
43. Id.
44. See Howard Erichson, Mississippi Class Actions and the Inevitability of Mass Aggregation, 24
Miss. C.L. REv. 285 (2005); Robert H. Klonoff, The Adoption of a Class Action Rule: Issues for Mississippi to Consider,24 Miss. C.L. REv. 261 (2005); David Rosenberg & John Scanlon, Class Actions in
Mississippi: To Be or Not to (b)(3), 24 Miss. C. L. REV. 153 (2005).
45. See, e.g., Abbott & Mallette, supra note 20, at 397-98 (reporting that overwhelming majority
of state court judges surveyed at that time favored adoption of Mississippi state class-action rule).
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federal courts have ever permitted historically or currently.46 Federal
courts have never applied Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 20 or 42 to permit the aggregation of hundreds or thousands of claims in joined or consolidated actions.4 7 Thus, at a minimum, the promulgation of a Mississippi
class-action rule would eliminate the disingenuousness of Mississippi decirules to permit pseudo-class actions,
sions construing Mississippi joinder
48
where the federal rule does not.
In addition, the Mississippi rulemakers, cognizant of the expansion of
Mississippi joinder rules to permit pseudo-class actions, have amended the
joinder rules to make it more difficult to apply those rules in a fashion that
would permit joinder of hundreds of parties and claims. 49 This rule reform
is part of a larger Mississippi 2004 legislative tort-reform initiative,5 ° which
has restricted punitive damage awards,5" as well as modified various Mississippi venue provisions to restrict forum shopping among Mississippi county
courts.52 Taken together, these legislative initiatives are intended to curb
abusive litigation and to restrain Mississippi from continuing as a magnet
forum for certain types of nationwide exploitative litigation.
Against this backdrop of tort reform initiatives, class-action proponents suggest that such restrictions instead counsel strongly in favor of Mississippi adopting a formal class-action rule-precisely to provide an
appropriate vehicle for achieving classwide justice for Mississippi citizens
injured as a consequence of living in modern, industrial society. Thus, what
the tort reform initiatives have taken away needs to be counterbalanced by
a class-action rule that will provide a formalistic mechanism for resolving
large-scale grievances and injuries.
Among the most prominent policy reasons, enactment of a Mississippi
class-action rule would permit all the salutary effects of class-action procedure in the federal courts. The rule would provide an appropriate procedural mechanism for the aggregate resolution of substantive claims. If
aggregative litigation exists and is inevitable,5 3 then it seems peevish of
Mississippi not to join the other forty-eight or forty-nine states in providing

46. Phillips, supra note 2, at 455-56 ("Mississippi courts liberally allow the aggregation and consolidation of large numbers of claimants 'to fill the gap left open by the unavailability of class actions in
Mississippi."') (citing Am. Bankers Ins. Co. of Fla. v. Alexander, 818 So. 2d 1073, 1078 (Miss. 2001).
47. See Janssen Pharm., Inc., 878 So. 2d at 64 (Easley, J., dissenting).
48. See H.R. 13; MS. Order 0-401, order amending Rule 20, 42, 82. See also Miss. R. Civ. P. cmts.
(2004); see also David W. Clark, State Court Class Actions in Mississippi: Why Adopt Them Now?, 24
Miss. C.L. REV. at 437, 443-45 (2005) (commenting on recent Mississippi legislative amendments restricting application of joinder rules); Christopher, supra note 38.
49. Id.
50. Id.
51. H.R. 13; see also Clark, supra note 48 (describing legislative limitations on punitive
damages).
52. See H.R. 13; MS. Order 0-401; see also Clark, supra note 48 (describing legislative limitations
on venue and concomitant restrictions on the ability of plaintiffs to forum-shop for favorable forums).
53. See Erichson, supra note 44.
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its citizens with a means for formally resolving aggregate litigation.54 In
addition, providing Mississippi citizens with a class-action rule enables the
judicial system to accomplish the maximal deterrent effect against bad-actor defendants and thus, to achieve justice on a systemic basis."
The arguments for Mississippi adopting a formal class-action rule and
joining the rest of the Union seem compelling, if not irrefutable. It does
seem odd, indeed, that Mississippi would remain a lone, quirky hold-out
among the states in not providing a class-action rule for resolution of aggregate claims. In the extreme, the absence of a class-action rule might deny
Mississippians the opportunity for equal justice provided seemingly to all
other citizens of the United States.
Are there, then, any possible reasons for not adopting a class-action
rule?56 To suggest that a state that does not have a class-action rule demur
from promulgating one seems akin to King Canute's efforts to hold back
the tide. Hence, while it seems nothing short of inevitable that Mississippi
will abandon its position as the last quirky state without a class-action rule,
at least some cautionary notes (and cautionary tales) are in order before
the Mississippi rulemakers embark on this inevitability.

IV.

BALANCING THE EQUITIES: TEN CONSIDERATIONS RULEMAKERS
OUGHT TO TAKE INTO ACCOUNT IN EVALUATING WHETHER
TO ADOPT A STATE CLASS-ACTION RULE

A.

Why Are We Doing This? Is This Rule Necessary?

It would seem eminent good common sense, before embarking on a
project of rule reform, that Mississippi rulemakers have a clear sense of not
only the existence of some problem, but also some good sense of the nature
of those problems giving rise to a need for change. In the federal rulemaking arena, the various rulemaking committees5 7 are permanent standing
committees that identify federal rules in need of amendment. The
rulemaking process is deliberative and, given the nature and scope of the
perceived problems, often glacial in pace.
The Advisory Committee on Civil Rules, the primary originator of
rule amendments, typically undertakes the study of rules that have proven
problematic over time. Once the Committee identifies federal rules in
need of amendment, the Committee may spend years generating proposals
54. Professor Robert H. Klonoff, Remarks at Mississippi College School of Law Symposium:
Love It or Leave It; An Examination of the Need for and Structure of a Class Action Rule for Mississippi (Feb. 18, 2005).
55. See generally Rosenburg & Scanlon, supra note 44 (arguing from vantage of maximal deterrent effect of class-action procedure); see also David Rosenberg, Adding a Second Opt-Out To Rule 23
(b)(3) Class Actions: Cost Without Benefit, 2003 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 19 (2004) (discussing the maximal
deterrent effect of mandatory non-opt-out class actions); David Rosenberg, Mandatory Litigation Class
Action: The Only Option for Mass Tort Cases, 115 HARV. L. REV. 831 (2002) (same themes).
56. But see Clark, supra note 48 (presenting arguments against Mississippi adopting a class-action
rule).
57. See generally 4 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT & ARTHUR R. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND

PROCEDURE: CIVIL 2D §§ 1001-1008 (1987) (history of federal rulemaking procedures).
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for rule reform.58 The federal rulemaking process entails successive rounds
of proposed new language and proposed Advisory Committee Notes,
which text eventually is subjected to a public notice and comment period.5 9
In the federal arena, proposed rulemaking is now a collaborative process
that includes participation by the bench, the bar, interest groups, and the
academic community.60
The recent amendments to the federal class-action Rule 23, for example, present a good illustration of a rule amendment process that began in
1991 and extended through final promulgation in 2003.61 Federal Rule of
Civil Procedure 11, dealing with truthfulness in pleadings and providing for
civil sanctions,6 2 was amended in 1983 to put "teeth" into the rule,6 3 and
then amended a decade later after experience demonstrated the harsh consequences of the 1983 rule amendments.' The Advisory Committee on
Civil Rules rapidly amended Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15(c), dealing
with amendment of pleadings and the "relation-back" doctrine, 65 in response to a Supreme Court decision that complicated rather than clarified
application of the rule.66

If the Mississippi rulemakers are about to embark on a rulemaking
process to consider whether to adopt a class-action rule, it would seem that
a useful starting point would be to ask: What is the problem Mississippi is
attempting to solve? Are the current aggregation rules-particularly the
Mississippi joinder and consolidation rules 20 and 42-not working? In
what ways are those rules not working? Does Mississippi have a problem
in search of a solution, or does it have a pre-determined solution (that is,
enactment of a class-action rule) in search of a problem?
The Mississippi rulemakers should look to more than anecdotal evidence of a litigation crisis to ascertain whether a rule-related problem exists in Mississippi, requiring promulgation of a class-action rule. It is
possible to conduct a reasoned, empirical study of complex litigation in the
Mississippi courts in order to determine whether Mississippi actually needs
58. Id.
59. Id.
60. See, e.g., Linda S. Mullenix, The Constitutionality of the Proposed Rule 23 Class Action
Amendments, 39 ARiz. L. REV. 615, 615-19 (1997) (describing the rule amendment process for the
then-proposed amendments to FED. R. Civ. P. 23).
61. Id.; see also FED. R. Crv. P. 23(f), (g) & (h) (amendments effective Dec. 1, 1998 and Dec. 1,
2003).
62. FED. R. Civ. P. 11.

63. See 5A CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT & ARTHUR R. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE: CIVIL 2D § 1331 (commenting on substantial amendment to Rule 11 in 1983 and reasons for
those amendments to deal with frivolous and other vexatious litigation inundating federal dockets).
64. Id. at §§ 1331-1332 (discussing further amendment of Rule 11 in 1993 to mitigate harsh consequences of 1983 amendments; thorough discussion of criticism of both 1983 and 1993 amendments to

Rule 11).
65. See FED. R. Civ. P. 15(c).
66. Schiavone v. Fortune, 106 S. Ct. 2379 (1986); see also FED. R. Civ. P. 15(c) amendment effective 1991 advisory committee's note.
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a class-action rule.67 Again, the federal experience is instructive in this
regard.
In 1990, Congress enacted the Civil Justice Reform Act (hereinafter
CJRA).6 8 Congress intended, by this legislation, to accomplish judicial reform in all the federal courts to accomplish the stated goals of Federal Rule
of Civil Procedure 1: to achieve the just, speedy, and efficient resolution of
civil disputes.6 9 The legislation required that all ninety-four federal district
courts conduct a docket assessment 7 ° and to propose rules, regulations, and
measures to enhance delivery of civil justice within each district court.71
The purpose of the CJRA requirement that each federal court conduct
a docket assessment was to provide the groundwork for each court promulgating and enacting a unique civil justice reform plan. 72 Congress recognized that each federal district court had different types of cases and
burdens; some federal districts experienced massive docket congestion,
while other federal courts handled their dockets fairly well. The purpose of
the docket assessment was to identify, inform, and educate the Civil Justice
Reform Act Advisory Groups of the nature of problems on the docket as
the starting point for considering possible new rules, regulations, and measures to deal with those problems.
The CJRA docket assessment projects, then, evaluated the nature and
types of cases within each federal court docket and how those cases were
resolved. On the civil side of the docket, the assessment included an analysis of the volume of simple cases (with relatively easy and fast disposition)
as contrasted with the volume of complex, multi-party cases (with relatively
longer time to disposition). Among many factors, CJRA docket assessments examined how the court processed or disposed of simple versus complex cases, whether the court had tracking processes for simple and
complex cases, the time from filing to ultimate disposition, the number of
judicial hours involved in resolving cases, the use of judicial resources, and
litigant satisfaction.
Each federal district court, as a consequence of its docket assessment,
was able to propose new rules, regulations, or measures for dealing with
67. Apparently, at least some such attempt at empirical research was conducted by a judicial
survey in 1993. See Abbott & Mallette, supra note 20, at 363-64 et seq.; the results of this survey
regarding adopting a class-action rule indicated that the overwhelming majority of Mississippi state
court judges favored adoption of a class-action rule, with some judges dissenting from this view.
68. Judicial Improvements Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-650, 104 Stat. 5089 (1990) (codified in
scattered sections of 28 U.S.C.); see also S. REP. No. 101-416 (1990); H. REP. No. 101-732 (1990). See
generally Linda S. Mullenix, Civil Justice Reform Comes to the Southern District of Texas: Creatingand
Implementing a Cost and Reduction Plan Under the Civil Justice Reform Act of 1990, 11 REv. LrrG. 165

(1992).
69. FED. R. Civ. P. 1; see also Mullenix, Civil Justice Reform, supra note 68, at 172-73 (describing
cornerstone principles of the Civil Justice Reform Act).
70. 28 U.S.C. § 472(c)(1) (1991); see also Mullenix, Civil Justice Reform, supra note 68, at 176
(describing basic tasks of Civil Justice Reform Advisory Groups).
71. 28 U.S.C. § 473 (1991). This section of the Act included a detailed list of recommended
procedural innovations that Advisory Groups were instructed to consider in the development of civil
justice reform plans. See also Mullenix, Civil Justice Reform, supra note 68, at 177.
72. Id.
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the particular types of cases on the docket. CJRA plans for each federal
court varied with the nature of each unique federal docket; those federal
courts with congested dockets and high volumes of complex cases tailored
their CJRA plans to segregate and address complex litigation.7 3 However,
other federal district courts (Montana, for example),7 4 concluded that the
judiciary was handling its docket quite well and, therefore, was in no need
of new rules, regulations, or measures to handle the court's docket.
For the Mississippi rulemakers, then, a docket assessment seems like
an eminently sensible precursor to embarking on the promulgation of a
new rule that has not previously existed under state law. These are the
types of questions worth examining: What is the incidence of multi-party
complex litigation in Mississippi state courts? What percentage of the total
annual Mississippi court dockets are complex, multi-party litigation? How
many of these cases are filed annually? In how many cases, or what percentage of the total annual docket, do the plaintiffs (or defendants) seek
joinder pursuant to Mississippi Rule of Civil Procedure Rule 20? How
many cases (or percentage of the total Mississippi annual docket) are consolidated pursuant to Mississippi Rule of Civil Procedure Rule 42? Are the
aggregate joinder cases so overwhelming the Mississippi state court dockets
such that promulgation of a class-action rule will ameliorate docket
congestion?
What is the time to disposition of Mississippi's complex, aggregate litigation? How long does it take from time of filing until ultimate disposition? How many judicial hours are consumed in handling, processing, or
otherwise resolving Mississippi's complex cases? How often does the court
need to involve judicial surrogates, such as special masters or accountants,
to assist in the resolution of complex cases?
How many of Mississippi's complex, aggregative cases result in settlements? What is the nature of those settlements? What remedy or relief
have Mississippi settlements in complex litigation provided, either to Mississippi citizens or to citizens of other states? Do such settlements involve
the oversight of a judicial officer? Does the court become involved in postsettlement administration of complex settlements?
In Mississippi state courts, how many complex cases involving aggregate claimants result in jury trials? How long are the jury trials in actuallytried complex cases? What have been the results? How have Mississippi
juries handled the resolution of complex cases? Have Mississippi juries
found it difficult to comprehend and resolve complex cases? Does the trial
73. See, e.g., Harry M. Reasoner, et al., Report and Plan Civil Justice Reform Act Advisory Group
of the United States District Courtfor the Southern District of Texas, 11 REV. LITIG. 203 (1992) (setting
forth the CJRA plan for the United States District Court for the Southern District of Texas). Eventually all ninety-four federal district courts promulgated CJRA plans in compliance with the federal legislation. The CJRA plans for the ninety-four federal district courts may be accessed online in a special
CJRA federal court database.
74. See Carl Tobias, Civil Justice Planning in the Montana FederalDistrict, 53 MoNT. L. REV. 239
(1992) (minimal need for new rules, regulations, or procedures to effectuate improved delivery of civil
justice in Montana federal district court).
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of aggregative litigation, pursuant to the Mississippi joinder rules, confuse
or mislead Mississippi juries?
Under current rules, what is the litigant and judicial satisfaction with
the resolution of aggregate claims in complex litigation? Are plaintiffs and
defendants satisfied with the process? Are the judges?
Finally, before embarking on a course of promulgating an entirely new
procedural rule for class actions, Mississippi rulemakers need to be cognizant of the scope and limitations on their own rulemaking authority. In the
federal arena, the federal judiciary's rulemaking authority is both authorized and circumscribed by the Rules Enabling Act.7 5 The Rules Enabling
Act embodies the simple principle that federal procedural rules may not
abridge, enlarge or modify substantive rights. Thus, the federal judiciary
could not initially or by amendment promulgate a class-action rule that has
effects on the underlying substantive law; any class-action rule must be a
procedural, housekeeping rule only. Some of the proposed 1996 amendments to Rule 23 were attacked precisely for transgressing the Rules Enabling Act.76
Apparently, the Mississippi judiciary is not constrained by a parallel,
analogous state Rules Enabling Act.77 However, similar principles organically circumscribe the Mississippi rulemakers by judicial decision; or at
least the Mississippi Supreme Court justices have recognized the limits of
their own rulemaking authority.7 8 From whatever sources, the task of
promulgating a class-action rule in Mississippi must be informed by the
jurisprudential principle governing the nature of procedural rules.
B.

Are Mississippi Citizens Unprotected Without a Class-Action Rule?

In addition to identifying the existence, nature, and extent of the problem necessitating promulgation of a state class-action rule, it also might be
useful for Mississippi rulemakers to ask whether Mississippi citizens are
somehow unprotected (or under-protected) in absence of a class-action
rule. If one of the purposes of a judicial system is to provide its citizens
access to neutral forums for dispute resolution and remediation of wrongdoing or injuries, then it would perhaps be useful to evaluate whether the
Mississippi legal system is failing its citizens by not providing them either
access to the courts, or remediation in the absence of a class-action rule.
75. 28 U.S.C. §§ 2071-2072; see Mullenix, Constitutionality,supra note 60, at 617-19 (discussing
the Rules Enabling Act limitation on procedural rulemaking, and citing authorities).
76. See Paul D. Carrington & Derek P. Apanovitch, The Constitutional Limits of Judicial
Rulemaking: The Illegitimacy of Mass-Tort Settlements Negotiated Under Federal Rule 23, 39 ARIz. L.
REV. 461 (1997) (arguing that proposed amendments to Rule 23 violated the Rules Enabling Act as
transcending the power of the judicial authority to promulgate procedural rules).
77. Hall v. State, 539 So. 2d 1338, 1345-46 (Miss. 1989); see also F. Keith Ball, Comment, The
Limits of the Mississippi Supreme Court's Rule-Making Authority, 60 Miss. L.J. 359 (1990) (rulemaking
authority lies exclusively within judicial branch, not legislature; constraints internally imposed by judiciary on itself).
78. Id.
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Moreover, because class counsel frequently plead state class actions to
embrace the claims of citizens from other states (so-called multistate or
nationwide class actions), it is also appropriate to ask what is Mississippi's
role in providing a forum for complex dispute resolution to citizens of the
entire United States? Is Mississippi failing in some important role by not
being able to serve as the class-action vindicator of rights of non-residents?
These inquiries ask the Mississippi rulemakers to evaluate the procedural alternatives to the class-action rule and to assess whether these alternatives fail to provide Mississippi citizens either access to the courts or
meaningful remedies.7 9 In this regard, the question relating to class-action
alternatives mimics the "superiority" inquiry that federal courts require for
certification of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure Rule 23(b)(3) class
action.8 °
In order for a federal court to certify a Rule 23(b)(3) damage class
action, the rule imposes two additional burdens on proponents of the class
action: they must demonstrate that common questions of law or fact
predominate over individual questions, and also must show that proceeding
as a class action is superior to any other means of resolving the dispute.8 1
The superiority requirement requires the court to evaluate all other alternatives; if a viable dispute resolution mechanism exists, then the court
weighs the "superiority" factor against class certification.
Stated differently, there are no presumptions favoring class certification,8 2 nor is there any right to proceed as a class action.8 3 Under received
class-action jurisprudence, it is possible for class counsel to satisfy all the
requirements for class certification, but the court in its discretion may still
decline to certify the class action.8 4 Proceeding as a class action, then, is
the procedural default when no other alternatives are available to resolve
the dispute.
Furthermore, Rule 23(b)(3) sets forth four factors that courts may
consider in assessing whether a proposed class action is a superior means
for proceeding.8 These factors include: (1) the interests of members of the
class in individually controlling the prosecution and defense of separate actions; (2) the extent and nature of any litigation concerning the controversy
already commenced by or against members of the class; (3) the desirability
79. The problem of the state provision of remedies is discussed infra Part IV(D).
80. See FED. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(3); see also Linda S. Mullenix, Complex Litigation-ClassAction
Superiority, NAT'L. L.J. Nov. 17, 2003, at 27 (citing cases and tests for superiority under FED. R. Civ. P.
23 in federal court).
81. FED. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(3); see generally 7A WRIGHT, MILLER & KANE, FEDERAL PRACTICE
2
AND PROCEDURE: CIVIL D §§ 1778-79 (predominance and superiority requirements).
82. See Szabo v. Bridgeport Machines Inc., 249 F.3d 672 (7th Cir. 2001).
83. See, e.g., Sun Coast Res., Inc. v. Cooper, 967 S.W.2d 525, 529 (Tex. App. 1998) pet. dismissed
W.o.j.

84. Burkhalter, 141 F.R.D. at 151 ("It is ultimately in the Court's 'discretion to determine the
maintainability and conduct of class actions."') (quoting Kassover v. Computer Depot, Inc., 691 F.
Supp. 1205, 1213 (D. Minn. 1987)).
85.

FED.

R. Civ. P. 23(b)(3)(A)-(D); see generally 7A

PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE: CIVIL 2D §

cases).

WRIGHT, MILLER

&

KANE,

FEDERAL

1780 (discussing the Rule 23(b)(3) factors and citing illustrative
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or undesirability of concentrating the litigation of the claims in the particular forum; and (4) the difficulties likely to be encountered in the management of a class action. 86 If the court's assessment of these factors causes
the court to conclude that a class action is not the superior means for
resolving the dispute, then the class should not be certified, but the dispute
can and should be resolved by other means.87
In evaluating superiority, one of the most conventional means that
courts utilize is to review the list of possible alternatives to the class action
to evaluate whether the dispute may be resolved according to these means.
This might prove a useful exercise for the Mississippi rulemakers before
embarking on a course of promulgating a state class-action rule. The pertinent question simply is: What procedural alternatives exist for aggregate
dispute resolution, and are these alternatives somehow inadequate to protect Mississippi and extra-territorial citizens from wrongdoing?
The possible answers to this question are parallel to the types of procedural mechanisms that federal courts assess in the superiority inquiry.
Thus, at the threshold, federal courts ask whether it is either possible or
more desirable for litigants to pursue individual litigation rather than to
seek collective or aggregate resolution of claims. Indeed, when the values
of individual claims are great, this factor weighs against aggregation because individual claimants might desire enhanced control over their individual lawsuits (which claims and control over such claims might be diluted
in an aggregate litigation). 88
Moreover, if individual lawsuits are filed in multiple venues, these individual lawsuits may be in different stages of discovery and trial-readiness.
Courts will decline to aggregate litigation when individual cases are proceeding on separate tracks; litigation that is more fully developed and on
the verge of trial is typically not suited for aggregation. In this situation,
individual litigation is a preferred procedural means for resolving
disputes.89
In addition to individual litigation, an array of other procedural means
exists for resolving aggregate claims, even under Mississippi law. The Mississippi procedural code provides for both joinder of parties and claims in
Mississippi Rules of Civil Procedure Rule 20 and consolidation of cases
through Mississippi Rules of Civil Procedure Rule 42. Both of these rules
are patterned on the analogous federal rule of civil procedure, and appropriately applied, provide a procedural vehicle for collecting and resolving
claims. The Mississippi rulemakers, more familiar with these joinder devices, need to assess the scope and limits of these rules in collecting cases
for common resolution.
Furthermore, to the extent that the Mississippi courts previously applied Mississippi Rule of Civil Procedure Rule 20 expansively to permit de
86.
87.
88.
89.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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facto class actions, the Mississippi joinder rules need to be reconsidered in
light of the Mississippi Supreme Court's limiting the Rule 20 joinder device
to conform with federal practice. Has the narrowing of the Mississippi
joinder Rule 20 consequently left Mississippi citizens without a viable
means for aggregating and resolving cases in a single forum?
Although the Mississippi procedural rules provide logical alternatives
for the class-action mechanism, a variety of alternative dispute mechanisms
exist that permit collective resolution of harms or grievances. Again, federal courts conventionally assess these alternative mechanisms in determining whether a class action is the superior means for resolving a dispute.
For example, state attorney general enforcement actions, or parens patrie actions, brought on behalf of the citizens of the state are another means
for remedying collective harms to state citizens.9" In addition, state administrative agencies and other regulatory branches provide bureaucratic
means to address particular types of grievances within the jurisdictional
reach of those agencies, such as the conduct of insurance companies licensed within the state. Both the state attorney general's office and administrative or regulatory agencies have proven effective in addressing and
redressing consumer, environmental, health, and antitrust harms.
Moreover, because state attorney generals are elected political officers, state attorney generals have a great incentive to seek out egregious
wrongdoers and to bring such wrongdoers to justice publicly.9' In recent
years state attorney generals-led by the Mississippi attorney generalhave pioneered the strategic alliance of state attorney generals' offices with
the private plaintiffs' bar to redress the balance of resources in pursuing
massive, complex litigation.92 The nationwide state attorney generals' tobacco settlement (which virtually almost all state attorney generals subsequently joined) created the model for this collaborative complex dispute
resolution mechanism between the public and private bars.9 3
The Mississippi rulemakers, then, perhaps should assess whether Mississippi has a robust state attorney general's office and regulatory system,
and whether these public auspices have effectively allied with the private
bar to assist in resolving complex cases to protect Mississippi citizens.
90. See, e.g., Susan Beth Farmer, More Lessons From the Laboratories:Cy Pres Distributionsin
Parens Patrie Antitrust Actions Brought by State Attorneys General, 68 FORDHAM L. REV. 361 (1999).
91. See, e.g., Edward Brunet, Class Action Objectors: Extortionist Free Riders or Fairness Guarantors, 2003 U. CHi. LEGAL F. 403, 449-56 (2003) (role of state attorneys general and state government
agencies in protecting state citizens in class-action litigation).
92. See, e.g., Texas v. Am. Tobacco Co., 14 F. Supp. 2d 956, 962 (E.D. Tex. 1997) (approving a
state parens patrie action seeking recovery of Medicaid losses against the tobacco industry); see also
Edward Brunet, Improving Class Action Efficiency by Expanded Use of Parens Patrie Suits and Intervention, 74 TUL. L. REV. 1919 (2000).
93. John C. Coffee, Jr., "When Smoke Gets in Your Eyes:" Myth and Realities About the Synthesis
of Private Counsel and Public Client, 51 DEPAUL L. REV. 241 (2001); David A. Dana, Public Interest
and Private Lawyers: Toward a Normative Evaluation of Parens PatrieLitigation by Contingency Fee, 51
DEPAUL L. REV. 315 (2001); Richard P. Ieyoub & Theodore Eisenberg, State Attorney GeneralActions,
the Tobacco Litigation and the Doctrine of Parens Patrie, 74 TUL. L. REV. 1859 (2000); Michael L.
Rustad, Smoke Signals From Private Attorneys General In Mega Social Policy Cases, 51 DEPAUL L.
REV. 511 (2001).
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In addition to attorney general actions to protect Mississippi citizens,
another possible alternative means for resolving collective claims is
through so-called qui tam (or relator) actions. Qui tam actions are typically pursued by an individual under a statute that establishes a penalty for
the commission or omission of a certain act and which penalties are recoverable in a civil action.94 In qui tam actions, part of the penalty goes to the
person successfully bringing the action, and the remainder reverts to the
state or some other institution.9 5 The person bringing the qui tam action
brings that action on behalf of himself as well as the state.9 6 Again, qui tam
actions are alternative means for resolving collective harms against state
citizens; Mississippi rulemakers should evaluate the status of qui tam actions and the incentives for such actions within the state legal system.
In assessing whether the citizens of Mississippi are unprotected in absence of a state class-action rule, the Mississippi rulemakers also ought to
bear in mind that the federal courts within Mississippi provide access to
federal class-action adjudication pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23." Thus, it is somewhat incorrect to convey the impression that
Mississippi citizens do not have class-action procedure available to resolve
aggregate disputes through this procedural mechanism. In addition, Mississippi citizens may be protected through the multi-state or nationwide class
actions that are certified in the courts of other states, which class actions or
class-action settlements include Mississippi citizens. This is true for class
multistate class actions that are certified or settled either in other state or
federal courts-Mississippi citizens may be encompassed and bound by
those class-action judgments or settlements.
Moreover, for Mississippi individual cases that are subject to federal
removal provisions, 98 these cases may then be transferred and consolidated
for coordinated pre-trial proceedings under the auspices of federal multidistrict litigation,9 9 including possible resolution through the certification
and settlement of a class action under the supervision of the Multi-District
Litigation (hereinafter MDL) court.
Finally, other procedural means for resolving aggregate litigation in
Mississippi include the use of alternative dispute resolution mechanisms
94. See Evan Caminker, Comment, The Constitutionalityof Qui Tam Actions, 99 YALE L.J. 341
(1989); Christopher C. Frieden, Comment, Protecting the Government's Interests: Qui Tam Actions
Under the False Claims Act and the Government's Right to Veto Settlements on Those Actions, 47 EMORY L.J. 1041 (1998); Leon Lazer, Supreme Court 2002 Term-The Property Cases: IOLTA, Qui Tam
Actions, and Punitive Damages, 20 ToURO L. REV. 327 (2004); Katherine Zimmer, Note, The Revitalization of Qui Tam Actions: The Statutory and ConstitutionalSignificance of the False Claims Act in
Environmental Litigation, 17 J. ENERGY NAT. RESOURCES & ENVTL. L. 43 (2002-03).
95. See Evan Caminker, supra note 94, at 341.
96. Id.
97. See supra nn. 8-20 (discussing reported Mississippi federal class-action decisions within recent years).
98. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1441-1447 (removal statutes).
99. 28 U.S.C. § 1407 (federal multidistrict litigation statute); see also FEDERAL JUDICIAL
CENTER, MANUAL FOR COMPLEX LITIGATION § 20.13 (4th ed. 2004) (multidistrict transfers under Section 1407).
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such as mediation, arbitration, conciliation, or other ad hoc settlement procedures. It is worth noting that disputes subject to contractual agreements
may contain an arbitration clause permitting classwide arbitration, or that
is otherwise silent on whether an arbitrator may conduct a classwide arbitration. The United States Supreme Court has recently indicated that
where an arbitration clause is silent concerning whether an arbitration provision permits classwide arbitration, the arbitrator may construe the clause
to determine whether to conduct a classwide arbitrated result. 1°°
In October 2003, the American Arbitration Association promulgated a
set of supplementary rules governing classwide arbitrations. 1° ' Thus, Mississippi citizens may find additional class-action procedural means available
when an underlying dispute involves a contractual arbitration clause that
either permits classwide arbitrations or is silent on the subject.
C. Are There Grievances or Injuries That Will Lack Redress in Absence
of a State Class-Action Rule?
In assessing whether Mississippi citizens are disadvantaged in the absence of a class-action rule, the rulemakers also ought to assess whether
there are certain types of injuries or grievances that will remain unremediated in absence of a class-action rule. In particular, certain types of
grievances historically have proven particularly suitable for classwide relief,
as the nature of the alleged injuries tend to affect large groups of claimants.
This certainly was true in the heyday of public institutional reform litigation during the 1960's and 1970's, when the majority of class actions sought
injunctive or declaratory relief through the Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
23(b)(2) class.
In the federal arena, the types of injuries that class-action procedure
has proven most efficacious in protecting large groups of claimants include
the protection of constitutional, civil, and employment discrimination
rights; the protection of statutory and consumer rights; and the protection
against antitrust injury. However, since at least 1995, the federal courts
have not typically permitted class certification of mass-tort injuries on a
class-action basis102-a jurisprudential conclusion subsequently followed
100. Green Tree Fin. Corp. v. Bazzle, 539 U.S. 444 (2003) (plurality decision).
101. See American Arbitration Association, Supplementary Rules for Class Arbitrations,at http://
www.adr.org/sp.asp?id=21936 (Apr. 10, 2005).
102. See, e.g., Valentino v. Carter-Wallace, Inc., 97 F.3d 1227, 1230 (9th Cir. 1996) (decertifying
products liability class action); Andrews v. AT&T Co., 95 F.3d 1014, 1018 (11th Cir. 1996) (reversing
the trial court's certification of a class of "900" telephone number service providers); Castano v. Am.
Tobacco Co., 84 F.3d 734, 752 (5th Cir. 1996) (decertifying nationwide class of tobacco claimants); In re
Am. Med. Sys., Inc., 75 F.3d 1069, 1090 (6th Cir. 1996) (reversing district court's certification of class
against breast implant manufacturer and its parent); Ih re General Motors Corp. Pick-Up Truck Fuel
Tank Prods. Liab. Litig., 55 F.3d 768, 822-23 (3d Cir. 1995) (vacating certification of a settlement class in
products liability litigation); In re Rhone-Poulenc Rorer Inc., 51 F.3d 1293, 1297-1304 (7th Cir. 1995)
(reversing certification of nationwide class of hemophiliac claimants who received tainted blood
products).
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by many state courts. 10 3
In order to determine whether Mississippi citizens are unprotected or
under-protected in absence of a state class-action rule, a docket assessment
would reveal the incidence of types of grievances peculiarly suited for classwide treatment. Is there a number-or significant number-of constitutional, statutory, or civil rights cases that leave Mississippi citizens
unprotected in absence of a state class-action rule? Or, are most constitutional and statutory violation cases pursued in federal courts under federal
law? Similarly, is the state attorney general's office lax in pursuing state
antitrust violations? What is the incidence of small claims consumer actions? Are any of these consumer actions subject to federal law or federal
protection, such as the Federal Truth in Lending Act? Do the Mississippi
federal courts provide adequate access to class-action procedure for redress
in consumer cases?
Finally, with regard to mass-tort litigation, has Mississippi experienced
a high incidence of mass-tort injuries for which a state class-action rule will
provide procedural relief? This particular question should be addressed
against the backdrop of the general trend in both federal and state courts
to deny class-action relief in mass-tort cases. 10 4 If the Mississippi
rulemakers were to decide to adopt a state class-action rule to provide a
procedural mechanism for resolving mass-tort litigation, then the
rulemakers need to be mindful of the inherent limitations on the courts'
rulemaking authority: to wit, that procedural rules may not abridge, enlarge or modify substantive rights. As others have argued, the resolution of
individual tort cases through the class-action mechanism, particularly
through class-action settlements, may transgress the rulemaking power of
05
the courts.1
D. Are There Damages or Remedies Available Through a State ClassAction Rule that Currently are Unavailable to Mississippians?
A further consideration for Mississippi rulemakers concerns whether,
in absence of a state class-action rule, Mississippi citizens are denied remedies that would otherwise be rewarded through the auspices of a class-action procedure. Similar to the discussion above, this inquiry must be
considered within the context of the limitations on judicial rulemaking.
103. See, e.g., Southwestern Refining Co. v. Bernal, 22 S.W.3d 425, 439 (Tex. 2000) (reversing
mass-tort class certification under TEXAs R. Civ. P. 42(b)(4) (Texas class opt-out damage class-action
rule)).
104. Of great historical concern has been Mississippi's asbestos docket, a personal injury tort litigation problem in common with many other states handling large numbers of asbestos claimants.
Nonetheless, the United States Supreme Court has twice invalidated nationwide global asbestos classaction settlements. See Ortiz v. Fibreboard Corp., 527 U.S. 815 (1999); Amchem Prods. Inc. v. Windsor,
521 U.S. 591 (1997).
105. See Carrington & Apanovitch, supra note 76 at 461 (arguing that the proposed (b)(4) provision for class-action settlements violated the Rules Enabling Act and created a federal rule of procedure with substantive effect); see also Martin H. Redish, Class Actions and the Democratic Difficulty:
Rethinking the Intersection of Private Litigation and Public Goals, 2003 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 71 (2003)
(arguing against concept that class-action rule may alter substantive rights to achieve public goals).
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Thus, the enactment of a class-action rule may not, through its remedies,
supply substantive relief in a class action that otherwise would not be available in a non-class litigation. 10 6

Many class-action remedies, especially those accomplished in class-action settlements, differ in nature and kind from the remedies an individual

might achieve in non-class litigation. Indeed, the aggregation of claims
within a class action may effectively dilute the value of individual claims in

litigation or settlement, which in10 7turn may be a powerful reason for eschewing a class-action approach.
Courts may provide class-action relief in various ways, some of which
are advantageous to class members, and others of which are not. If a class

action is actually litigated in a jury trial, the court may order a multiphase
trial in which the liability and damage phases are tried separately. 10 8 In
some instances, the damage phase of a class proceeding may be accomplished through individual damage trials10 9 or awards made by a special
master in individualized proceedings. ° Class-action litigation that is structured on this model is most likely to approximate the damage recovery that
an individual claimant would receive in an individualized litigation. In addition, class litigation structured on this model accomplishes the goals of

judicial efficiency and economy by severing and jointly trying classwide liability issues (or other special issues).

However, in reality, most class-action lawsuits are never actually tried;
most class-action cases are settled short of trial."' The nature and scope of
106. See Martin H. Redish, supra note 105 (arguing that the class-action procedure may not afford
class claimants any type or form of relief that would not otherwise be available in a non-class lawsuit; to
do so transgresses the rulemaking authority of the judiciary in creating substantive rights and
remedies).
107. See FED. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(3)(A) (which factor militates against class certification where individual class members have a high degree of interest individually in controlling either the prosecution or
defense of their action). This provision historically has been applied to deny class certification in cases
where individual damage claims vary and some class members have higher value claims than others. In
addition, the Rule 23(b)(3) class provides for the ability of class members to opt-out or exclude themselves from the binding effect of the class judgment; this opt-out provision is intended to permit class
claimants with varying claims values to avoid the dilution of worth of their claims through aggregate
settlement.
108. See FEDERAL JUDICIAL CENTER, MANUAL FOR COMPLEX LITIGATION at §§ 21.24, 21.5 (4th
ed. 2004) (describing the role of issues classes and bifurcated trial of liability and damage issues) and id.
at § 22.7.75 (issues classes in mass-tort class-action litigation).
109. See, e.g., In re Plywood Antitrust Litig., 655 F.2d 627, 631-36 (5th Cir. 1981) (permissible to
try issue of statutory antitrust violation, including existence of injury and method of calculating damages, separately from amount of individual damages); Franklin Music Co. v. Am. Broad. Cos., 616 F.2d
528, 538 (3d Cir. 1979) (upholding bifurcation of liability and damage phases of trial); but cf. Matter of
Rhone-Poulenc Rorer, Inc., 51 F.3d 1293 (7th Cir. 1995) (reversing class certification of trial plan that
proposed classwide trial of liability issues, followed by remand of individual cases for individual damage
trials); Ala. v. Blue Bird Body Co., 573 F.2d 309, 318-19, 328 (5th Cir. 1978) (disapproving bifurcation
of liability and damage phases of trial).
110. MANUAL FOR COMPLEX LITIGATION, supra note 99, § 21.644, 21.661 (4th ed.) (role of special
masters and other judicial adjuncts in settlement review and settlement administration).
111. See DEBORAH R. HENSLER, ET AL., CLASS ACTION DILEMMAS (Rand Institute for Civil Justice 2000); see also The Vanishing Trial, 1 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. (2004) (collection of articles
concerning the vanishing trial and concomitant rise in settlements). The phenomenon of the vanishing
jury trial appears to be true for state court civil actions, as well as federal actions. See Brian J. Ostrom,
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classwide remedies that are accomplished through class-action settlements,

then, should be the focus of concern for rulemakers contemplating enacting
a class-action rule. Will the provision of a class-action procedure, with the
reality of the way in which class-action litigation is actually resolved

through settlements, better protect Mississippi citizens in terms of relief?
Experience indicates that class-action settlements follow patterns
across types of class actions. In constitutional and civil rights class litiga-

tion, the most prevalent form of relief pursuant to the Rule 23(b)(2) class is
the injunction or the declaratory judgment; prevailing class-action jurisprudence severely restricts the ability to recover damages in the (b)(2) class
action. 1 2 Because most constitutional and statutory-violation litigation, especially in the employment discrimination field, is pursued in federal court,
the enactment of a Mississippi class-action rule will neither enhance nor
detract from the ability of Mississippians to achieve injunctive or declaratory relief in these types of class actions.
In the antitrust arena, states' attorneys general are empowered to pursue antitrust violations parens patrie, with the proceeds of any favorable
judgment reverting to the state treasury through cy pres or other doctrines. 11 3 Generally, the enactment of a Mississippi state class-action rule
will neither enhance nor detract from the ability of Mississippi citizens to

achieve remedial recovery in antitrust class actions.
In the mass-tort personal injury field, it is doubtful that the enactment
of a Mississippi state class-action rule would redound to the benefit of Mississippi citizens in damage recovery. Initially, mass-tort class-action claimants face considerable obstacles in obtaining class certification.' 14 In mass-

tort actions that involve different types or severity of injuries, such as asbestos litigation, many claimants with high-value claims may not wish to be
included in a class, but may instead desire to pursue individual litigation." 5
et al., Examining Trial Trends in State Courts, 1976-2002, 1 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 755 (2004).
Based on this empirical evidence, there is little reason to believe that Mississippi state class actions
would not replicate the federal experience-which is that most class actions are settled, not actually
litigated.
112. See, e.g., Allison v. Citgo Petroleum Corp., 151 F.3d 402-410, 417-19 (5th Cir. 1998) (reversing a Rule 23(b)(2) class certification of an employment discrimination class action under the 1991
amendments to Title VII because the class request for damages was not "incidental" to the predominant form of injunctive relief requested by the class); but cf Robinson v. Metro-North Commuter R.R.
Co., 267 F.3d 147, 157 (2d Cir. 2001) (eschewing the bright-line rule of Allison and adopting an ad hoc
approach that considers the plaintiffs' subjective intent in seeking class relief). Currently, there is a
split among the federal circuits concerning whether litigants may seek and obtain monetary damages in
the context of a Rule 23(b)(2) mandatory class action. See Linda S. Mullenix, Complex Litigation-To
(b)(2) or Not To (b)(2)?, NAT'L L.J., July 26, 2004 at 12 (discussing split among circuits with regard to
ability to pursue damages in the context of a Rule 23(b)(2) class action).
113. See discussion of state attorney general actions, supra at nn. 90-93.
114. See discussion of obstacles to class certification of mass-tort cases post-1995, supra at nn.
105-109.
115. This was true in the original Dalkon Shield litigation, where no plaintiffs stepped forward to
represent the class, and many claimants opposed certification of a Dalkon Shield class in the California
courts. See In re N. Dist. of Cal., Dalkon Shield IUD Prods. Liab. Litig., 693 F.2d 847 (1982) (overturning certification of a nationwide Rule 23(b)(1)(B) punitive damage class and a Rule 23(b)(3) California
compensatory damage class).
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If a significant number of class members desire to pursue individual litiga-

tion, this critical mass will defeat the possibility of class certification. In the
alternative, a class litigation may be undermined and impaired if significant

116
numbers of personal injury claimants choose to opt-out of the class.
Moreover, mass-tort class-action settlements have been plagued by

conflicts of interest, sweetheart deals, problems of inadequate representa-

tion, various administrative failures, 117 and the problem of representing future claimants in latent injury mass-tort actions." 8
A further trend in attempting to resolve some mass-tort claims on a
classwide basis has been the development of the so-called "medical monitoring" class. In federal courts, the medical monitoring class is a function
of state law: federal courts look to state law in order to first ascertain

whether the state legislatively has enacted a claim for medical monitoring.19 In federal courts, medical-monitoring class actions have chiefly,
though not exclusively, been pursued under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(b)(2), and many, if not most, of these classes have failed for a lack

of cohesiveness among the proposed class members. 2 ° Some medical

monitoring classes, such as the Fen-Phen litigation, have been settled under
Rule 23 medical monitoring auspices; however, the implementation of

116. Indeed, many class-action settlement agreements contain so-called "exploding provisions,"
by which the settlement agreement is vitiated and voided if a certain percentage of the class members
opt-out of the settlement.
117. The United States Supreme Court invalidated both the Amchem and the Ortiz nationwide
asbestos class-action settlements on the grounds of inadequacy of class representation and impermissible conflicts of interest; see Amchem Prods., Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591 (1997); Ortiz v. Fibreboard
Corp., 527 U.S. 815 (1999). The 1984 Agent Orange settlement was collaterally attacked, nearly fifteen
years after final approval by the Second Circuit, for lack of adequate representation. See Stephenson v.
Dow Chem. Co., 273 F.3d 249 (2d Cir. 2001); see also U.S. Supreme Court citation with 4-4 nondecision, In re Agent Orange Prod. Liab. Litig., Dow Chem. Co. v. Stephenson, 537 U.S. 999 (2002).
Academic commentators and judges have extensively documented the various ethical problems relating
to the resolution of mass-tort class actions, particularly in the settlement context. See generally, John C.
Coffee, Jr., Class Wars: The Dilemma of the Mass Tort Class Action, 95 COLUM. L. REV. 1343 (1995)
(conflicts of interest in settling and resolving mass-tort settlement classes); John C. Coffee, Jr., The
Regulation of EntrepreneurialLitigation:Balancing Fairnessand Efficiency in the Large Class Action, 54
U. CHI. L. REV. 877 (1987); Alon Klement, Who Should Guard the Guardians?A New Approach for
Monitoring Class Action Lawyers, 21 REV. LITiG. 25 (2002); Alon Klement, FeastingWhile the Widow
Weeps: Georgine v. Amchem Products, Inc., 80 CORNELL L. REV. 1045 (1995) (description of the allegedly collusive global asbestos class-action settlement subsequently invalidated by the United States
Supreme Court).
118.

MANUAL FOR COMPLEX LITIGATION (4th ed.), supra note 99, §22.55 (providing for represen-

tation of future claimants).
119. See, e.g., In re Paoli R.R. Yard PCB Litig., 35 F.3d 717, 787-88 (3d Cir. 1994) (elements for
certification of a medical monitoring claim); Linda S. Mullenix, FederalPractice: Complex LitigationMedical Monitoring, NAT'L L.J., Mar. 29, 1999, at B15.
120. See, e.g., Barnes v. Am. Tobacco Co., 161 F.3d at 142-44 (3d Cir. 1998) (affirming decertification of a medical monitoring class for lack of cohesiveness among tobacco smokers); see also Cook v.
Rockwell Int'l Corp., 181 F.R.D. 473, 478-80 (D. Colo. 1998) (decertifying medical monitoring class
because underlying claims were actually claims for personal injury damages, not for equitable relief);
but cf. In re Diet Drugs Prods. Liab. Litig., 1999 WL 673066, at *19 (E.D. Pa. Aug. 26, 1999) (medical
monitoring settlement class certified). See generally MANUAL FOR COMPLEX LITIGATION (4th ed.),

supra note 99, § 22.74 (medical monitoring class actions).
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medical monitoring relief and or the payment of claims has proven problematic.1 21 In the mass-tort arena, then, Mississippi rulemakers need to assess whether enactment of a state class-action rule will somehow facilitate
resolution of personal injury claims on an aggregate basis, where such resolution in the federal arena has been plagued with problems for more than
two decades.
In the consumer protection sphere, class-action litigation has been jus12
tified as the primary purpose for the federal Rule 23(b)(3) class action. 1
The small claims consumer class action is known as a "negative value" suit
because the value of any individual's claim is too small to provide an incentive either to the claimant or an attorney to pursue relief. However, some
courts believe that the deterrent effect achieved through a classwide judgment against a defendant malfeasor justifies certification even though no
class member will receive significant damages.
A common class remedy in small claims consumer class actions typically is the determination and award of a "common fund." Whether
through litigation or settlement, the court then determines a methodology
for distribution of the common fund. Typically, in successful small claims
consumer class actions the relief that the court affords may result in varying
benefits-or no benefits at all-to class claimants. Typically, in successful
small claims class actions, the monetary return to any class member may be
de minimis, may go unclaimed, may be distributed through an alternative
cy pres award to a charity or research enterprise, or may revert to the
12 3
defendant.
In some cases, where it would be difficult or burdensome to evaluate
individual claims to damages, courts may order a so-called "fluid recovery"
124
to class members, without the need for proof of individual damages.
And, perhaps most notorious in the realm of small claims consumer class
actions is the controversial "coupon settlement," wherein class claimants
receive no monetary recovery but instead a coupon or rebate for the future
purchase of a defendants' products or services. 125 Coupon settlements in
consumer class-action litigation have become so controversial that the 2005

121. MANUAL FOR COMPLEX LITIGATION (4th ed.), supra note 99, § 22.925 (evaluating nonmonetary benefits, including difficulties in implementing medical monitoring fund relief).
122. Amchem, 521 U.S. at 623 (major reason for the (b)(3) class category is to protect small claims
consumer class actions).
123. MANUAL FOR COMPLEX LITIGATION (4th ed.), supra note 99 at §§ 21.66, 21.662 (undistributed funds).
124. Id. at § 21.662.
125. In re Gen. Motors Pickup Truck Fuel Tank Prod. Liab. Litig., 55 F.3d 768, 799 (3d Cir. 1995)
(reversing class certification of a class settlement involving coupons to class members); In re Ford Motor Co. Bronco Ii Prod. Liab. Litig., 1995 U.S. Dist. Lexis 3507, *19 (E.D. La.) (agreeing with objectors
that coupon settlement had value to class of effectively zero).
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Class Action Fairness Act provided specific provisions restricting the terms
and conditions of coupon settlements.1 26
The enactment of a Mississippi class-action rule may provide Mississippi citizens with a new procedural vehicle to vindicate consumer rights
and to enhance deterrence in small-claims consumer class actions. On the
other hand, the creation of a Mississippi state procedural means for vindicating small consumer claims will bring with it the attendant problems that
have developed in the federal arena, such as coupon settlements. Hence,
the pertinent question seems to be whether enactment of a Mississippi state
class-action rule will further enhance protection of Mississippi consumers,
or will instead burden state courts and judges with litigation that has little if
no benefit for Mississippi claimants. In addition, Mississippi rulemakers
should perhaps inquire whether the Mississippi federal courts, the Mississippi attorney general, and Mississippi state administrative agencies fall
short of delivering justice to Mississippi consumers.
Finally, no discussion about class-action relief is complete without
evaluation of the counter-balancing consideration of attorney fees and
transaction costs involved in resolving class litigation. Numerous Rand Institute of Civil Justice and other studies a2 7 have demonstrated that the most
significant factor in class litigation is the high transaction costs and attorneys fees that considerably erode the monetary return to class claimants in
damage class actions. Again, rulemakers should assess the upside potential
afforded by classwide relief, tempered by the reality of the high transaction
costs entailed in class litigation. In the end, the questions remain the same:
Will Mississippi citizens be better off with a class-action rule in place to
vindicate rights and injuries?
E.

Will Enactment of a State Class-Action Rule Enhance Deterrence of
Defendant/MisfeasorBad Conduct?

One of the major themes pervading the class-action literature, of
which Professor David Rosenberg of Harvard Law School is the primary
proponent, 12 8 is that class-action litigation serves as a powerful deterrent
against the bad actions of irresponsible corporate defendants. In essence,
the class action, by aggregating hundreds or thousands of individual claims
in one litigation, levels the litigation playing field between the resourceweak individual claimant and the resource-rich defendant. This is the chief
rhetorical argument supporting advocacy of the class-action rule. Society,
then, achieves a benefit through the enhanced power of aggregate litigation
126. Class Action Fairness Act of 2005, S. 5, 109th Cong. § 3 (2005) (prohibiting a federal district
court from approving a proposed coupon settlement that is not found to be fair, adequate and reasonable). Texas amended its class-action rule during summer 2003 to adopt provisions tracking the proposed amendments to FED. R. Civ. P. 23; in so doing, the amended Texas rule contains provisions
restricting attorney fee awards in class actions with coupon settlement. See TEX. R. Civ. P. 42(i)(2).
127. HENSLER, et al., supra note 111 (discussing transaction and attorney fees in class litigation
and extent to which awards to class claimants are reduced or affected by high transaction costs).
128. See Rosenberg, supra note 44.
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to both punish and deter bad actors. For Professor Rosenberg, this maximal deterrent effect
is best accomplished through the mandatory class-ac129
tion settlement.
In considering whether to enact a state class-action rule, Mississippi
rulemakers certainly should consider and evaluate the persuasive force of
the deterrence argument, especially in the class-action context. In so doing,
however, rulemakers should investigate the empirical support for the deterrence argument. Have research institutes or individual investigators actually validated the proposition that the actual or threatened prospect of
class-action litigation deters defendant bad conduct? Are there actual facts
to support the conclusion that class-action litigation, or class-action settlements, deter potential defendants from bad acts or cause them to modify
their conduct? Or, is the deterrence argument a rhetorical argument with
high emotional appeal?
In addition, if deterrence is the powerful rationale for providing a
class-action rule, are corporate defendants already not deterred sufficiently
by the threat of Mississippi federal class actions? Also, are Mississippi citizens not realizing the class-action deterrence effect when they are included
as class members in other state and federal class actions?
Mississippi rulemakers ought also to consider the role of insurance and
re-insurance in resolving disputes, including class-action disputes. In reality, many if not most defendants that enter into class-action settlements do
so in the shadow of their liability coverage. Insurers and re-insurers are the
silent off-stage actors in class litigation. To what extent does insurance coverage support or detract from the deterrence theory of class litigation? In
the same vein, to what extent is the deterrence theory supported or weakened by the reality that corporations have litigation and liability reserves,
and are able to pass-along the costs of litigation, including expensive and
longstanding class litigation?
F. Will Enactment of a Class-Action Rule Enhance Judicial Efficiency
and Economy? Will A Class-Action Rule Increase Burdens on
the Court?
Another major justification for the existence of a class-action rule is
that this procedural mechanism enhances judicial efficiency and economy.
This is a perspective on class litigation that proceeds entirely from the view
of the burdens of repetitive litigation on the judiciary's docket.13 ° The possible prospect that a state class-action rule will enhance judicial efficiency
129. Id.
130. In this regard, the Advisory Committee's Note to Rule 23(b)(3) class actions is instructive:
In the situations to which this subdivision relates, class action treatment is not as clearly called
for as in those described above [in (b)(1) and (b)(2) class categories], but it may nevertheless
be convenient and desirable depending on the individual facts. Subdivision (b)(3) encompasses those cases in which a class action would achieve economies of time, effort, and expense, and promote uniformity of decision as to person similarly situated, without sacrificing
proceduralfairness or bringing about other undesirable results.
Advisory Committee's note, FED. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(3) (italics added).
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and economy, and assist Mississippi state judges with overburdened dockets, is indeed another attractive rhetorical argument favoring adoption of a
class-action rule.
As with all other rhetorical arguments that support enactment of a
state class-action rule, the Mississippi rulemakers should assess this "judicial efficiency" argument (and conclusory assertion) against the reality of
class litigation experienced in federal courts. Rather than enhancing judicial efficiency and economy, class litigation will entangle Mississippi state
judges in an array of papers, motions, pleadings, hearings, supervision, and
other entanglements not previously experienced even under the problematic Mississippi Rule 20 joinder cases. In the end, the rulemakers need to
look hard and long at whether a state class-action rule, on balance, will
benefit the state judiciary or burden it more than before the advent of state
class-action litigation.
There is a jurisprudential, doctrinal underpinning that explains why
class litigation imposes numerous additional burdens on the judiciary in
class-action litigation, as opposed to non-class litigation. Class-action litigation is fundamentally different than any other procedural form of litigation; it is representationalin nature.13 1 Consequently, many due process
concerns adhere to class proceedings, which due process concerns are not
present in ordinary non-class litigation because the parties are actually present to represent their own interests. Class-action litigation aggregates
hundreds or thousands of absent class members who are virtually represented by a few class representatives and class counsel. Class-action jurisprudence, then, has long been concerned with the due process protections
132
of absent class members who will be bound by a class judgment.
As a consequence of this due process underpinning of class litigation,
the judge is called upon to serve as a fiduciary or protector of the class.
Without a doubt, the federal class-action rule, and its state counterparts,
involves the judge in a supervisory capacity over proposed class litigation.
Thus, in class litigation a judge is called upon to exercise judicial power and
authority in ways the judge is not required to exercise in non-class litigation. Almost all these exercises of supervisory authority are manifestations
of due process concerns for protection of the interests and rights of absent
class members. Indeed, class litigation requires enhanced judicial supervision over institution, development, and resolution of class litigation, which
otherwise is not required in non-class litigation.
There are numerous ways in which class actions involve judicial supervision, from the initial filing of a class complaint through post-settlement
administration.1 33 Pursuant to federal practice and procedure, once a complaint has been filed as a class action, the court becomes involved in pre131. See Hansberry v. Lee, 311 U.S. 32, 42-43 (1940); Supreme Tribe of Ben-Hur v. Cauble, 255
U.S. 356, 363 (1921).
132. See supra note 131.
133. See generally MANUAL FOR COMPLEX LITIGATION (4th ed.), supra note 99, §§ 21 et seq.
(class-action procedure generally); § 22.7 (class actions in mass-tort cases); § 30 (antitrust class actions);
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certification case management, 134 which may involve pre-certification court
orders relating to communications with the class13 5 and the scope and limits
of permissible discovery.1 36 In addition, the court may be called upon to
decide an array of pre-certification dispositive motions,13 7 including mo-

tions concerning legal sufficiency of the claims,13 8 jurisdictional challenges, 139 standing14and
other justiciability issues,'140 as well as summary
n

judgment motions.
Although the federal class-action rule does not specifically require an
evidentiary class certification hearing, many federal and state courts now

conduct evidentiary class certification hearings in order to determine
whether the class proponents can satisfy the "rigorous analysis" test for

granting class certification. 1 42 The Manualfor Complex Litigation Fourth
indicates that "[a]n evidentiary hearing may be necessary in a challenge to
the factual basis for a class action.' 43 The rigorous analysis standard requires that the court go beyond the pleadings, and evaluate the claims, defenses, and underlying substantive law to determine whether the
proponents of the class action can satisfy the Rule 23(a) and (b)
1 44
requirements.

§§ 31.31, 31.5 (securities and shareholder derivative class actions); §32 (employment discrimination
class actions).
134.

MANUAL FOR COMPLEX LITIGATION (4th ed.), supra note 99, § 21.1 et seq.

135. Id. at § 21.12.
136. Id. at §§ 21.13-21.14.
137. Id. at § 21.133 ("The court may rule on motions pursuant to Rule 12, Rule 56, or other
threshold issues before deciding on class certification; however, such rulings bind only the named parties. Most courts agree, and Rule 23(c)(1)(a) reflects, that such precertification rulings on threshold
dispositive motions are proper, and one study found a substantial -rate of precertification rulings on
motions to dismiss or for summary judgment. Precertification rulings frequently dispose of all or part of
the litigation.").
138. See FED. R. Civ. P. 12(b) (motions to dismiss).
139.

MANUAL FOR COMPLEX LITIGATION (4th ed.), supra note 99, § 21.133 ("Efficiency and econ-

omy are strong reasons for a court to resolve challenges to personal or subject-matter jurisdiction
before ruling on certification.").
140. See Ortiz v. Fibreboard Corp., 527 U.S. 815, 831 (1999) (stating that class certification issues
are "logically antecedent" to court's evaluation of Article III issues); but see Linda S. Mullenix, Standing and Other Dispositive Motions After Amchem and Ortiz: The Problem of "Logically Antecedent"
Inquiries, 2004 MICti. L. REV. 703 (2004) (arguing that the Court's "logically antecedent" language in
Ortiz was not intended to instruct courts to defer ruling on pre-certification dispositive motions).
141. See FED. R. CIv. P. 56; Cowen v. Bank United of Tex., 70 F.3d 937 (7th Cir. 1995) (reasons
for and consequences of ruling on summary judgment motions prior to class certification decision).
142. See, e.g., Gen. Tele. Co. v. Falcon, 457 U.S. 147, 161 (1982); In re Am. Med. Sys., Inc., 75 F.3d
1069, 1078-79 (6th Cir. 1996) ("The Supreme Court has required district courts to conduct a 'rigorous
analysis' into whether the prerequisites of Rule 23 are met before certifying a class"); Castano, 84 F.3d
at 744 (5th Cir. 1996) (courts applying the "rigorous analysis" test requires "[gloing beyond the pleadings is necessary, as a court must understand the claims, defenses, relevant facts, and applicable substantive law in order to make a meaningful determination of the certification issues."). The Manualfor
Complex Litigation indicates that "[a] hearing under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(c) is a routine
part of the certification decision." MANUAL FOR COMPLEX LITIGATION, supra note 99, § 21.21.
143. MANUAL FOR COMPLEX LITIGATION, supra note 99, § 21.21.
144. The class-action proponents seeking certification carry the burden of proving that all the
elements for certification are satisfied; the defendant carries no burden to disprove satisfaction of any
certification requirements. See In re Am. Med. Sys., 75 F.3d at 1079. Moreover, courts may not apply
any presumptions favoring class certification on a motion for class certification. See Szabo v.
Bridgeport Machs., Inc., 249 F.3d 672, 676 (7th Cir. 2001).
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Class certification hearings are conducted based on pleadings, motion,
papers, and exhibits to the court. Many state courts, such as Texas, now
hold evidentiary class certification hearings over several days, 45 which
hearings involve live witness testimony and often the production of voluminous documentary evidence. 146 In addition, many courts now consider ex-

pert witness testimony offered in support or opposition to class
certification.14 7 In turn, the proffer of expert witness testimony at class

certification hearings may involve the court in preliminary Daubert-type
hearings to determine
the admissibility of expert witnesses on class certifi1 48
cation issues.

There are numerous other ways in which judges are enmeshed in the
ongoing class litigation. The development of many class actions tends to be
a fluid process as class counsel continue to investigate facts and the law.
Consequently, class counsel frequently amend the class complaint numerous times prior to a class certification hearing. Amended petitions are revised to reformulate the class definition, expand or contract the scope of
the class, create or jettison proposed subclasses, add or eliminate various
claims, and expand or modify requested remedies.

It is not unusual, in state courts that permit liberal amendment of
pleadings, for class complaints to be repeatedly amended. 149 Judges are
involved in this repetitive process of successive amended class petitions to

the extent that the court must review and permit amended pleadings. In
addition, in the role as guardian of the interests of absent class members,
the court needs to be especially attentive to amended pleadings when class
counsel recast a class definition to abandon segments of a previously
pleaded class, or abandons claims, legal theories, or remedies, previously
150
advanced in a prior pleading.

In class litigation, unlike ordinary litigation, the judge will be involved
in the selection and appointment of class counsel,'15 as well as approving
145. See, e.g., Schein v. Stromboe, 28 S.W.3d 196, 204 (Tex. App. 2000) (describing class certification hearing over multiple days, involving submission of voluminous documentary evidence), rev'd 102
S.W.3d 675 (2003).
146. Schein, 28 S.W.3d at 204 (voluminous documents produced at certification hearing).
147. See, e.g., In re Visa Check/MasterMoney Antitrust Litig., 280 F.3d 124, 134-35 (2d Cir. 2001)
(affirming district court's reliance on expert witness testimony in support of class certification); In re
Linerboard Antitrust Litig., 203 F.R.D. 197, 214-18 (E.D. Pa. 2001) (econometrics expert offered to
prove up predominance requirement and ability to prove damages on classwide basis); In re Cardizem
CD Antitrust Litig., 200 F.R.D. 297, 321-26 (E.D. Mich. 2001) (expert used to show ability to prove up
classwide damages); see also MANUAL FOR COMPLEX LrITGATION (4th ed.), supra note 99, § 21.21.
148. Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharms., 509 U.S. 579, 592-92 (1993).
149. Leonard v. Farmer's Ins. Exch., 125 S.W.3d 55 (Tex. App. 2003) (which case went through
fourteen amended petitions at the time of class certification).
150. In some state jurisdictions, such as Texas, the abandonment of claims through successive
pleadings and amendments may result in a finding of lack of adequacy of the class representatives and
class counsel. See Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Bowden, 108 S.W.3d 385, 403 (Tex. App. 2003), cert.
granted, 2004 Tex. LEXIS 883 (Tex. Sept. 10. 2004).
151. See FED. R. Civ. P. 23(g) (to the extent that state rulemakers begin the process of revising
their state class action rules to make those rules parallel to the federal rule, state courts will now become more pro-actively involved in selecting and appointing class counsel). See, e.g., TEX. R. Civ. P.
42(g) (amended 2003 to parallel 2003 amendments to FED. R. Civ. P. 23).
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and supervising the pro hac vice petitions of numerous out-of-state counsels, who tend to appear in state class litigation involving corporate defendants with a national presence. Prior to 2003, courts routinely appointed
class counsel as part of the court's adequacy findings. 152 However, Federal
Rule of Civil Procedure 23(g) (effective December 1, 2003) now involves
federal courts in a more pro-active process for selecting and appointing
class counsel.1 5 3 The new subdivision (g) permits a court to appoint interim
counsel, pending a determination of the final selection of class counsel.'5 4
Thus, a court now may be involved in reviewing the qualifications, expertise, resources, and other factors,1 55 such as proposed fee arrangements, 5 6
relating to multiple sets of lawyers at different junctures of a proposed class
litigation.
Class-action litigation often entails complicated questions relating to
58
discovery 15 and permissible communications with class members.1
Judges frequently are called upon to determine the permissible scope of
discovery prior to class certification, with defendants seeking to cabin discovery to information relating solely to class certification requirements,
and class counsel seeking more open-ended merits discovery.1 59 Courts
typically handle disputes over the scope of pre-certification discovery
through motions and oral argument. In addition, prior to class certification, courts may be presented with issues concerning whether class counsel
or defense counsel may contact absent class members, take in-person
surveys, or send out questionnaires to actual or potential class members. 6 °
If the court certifies a class action, the court subsequently may become
enmeshed in further discovery/communication disputes relating to the per1 61
missible scope of discovery and communications, in the class context.
Once a class is certified, issues relating to permissible discovery and communications become even more permeated with due process concerns, and
consequently require even more active judicial involvement and supervi162
sion in order to prevent illegitimate contacts with absent class members.
152. FED. R. Civ. P. 23(a)(4); see also Linda S. Mullenix, Complex Litigation-The New Rule
23(g), NAT'L L.J., Feb. 7, 2005, at 12.
153. FED. R. Civ. P. 23(g); see also MANUAL FOR COMPLEX LrTIGATION, supra note 99, § 21.27
(appointment of class counsel).
154. FED. R. Civ. P. 23(g)(2)(A).
155. FED. R. Civ. P. 23(g)(1)(C).
156. FED. R. Civ. P. 23(g)(1)(C)(iii).

157. MANUAL FOR COMPLEX LITIGATION (4th ed.) supra note 99, § 21.13 (standards for class certification and pre-certification discovery); § 21.14 (pre-certification discovery); § 21.41 (post-certification discovery from class members); § 22.8 (discovery in mass-tort cases).
158. Id. at § 21.12 (pre-certification communications with proposed class members); § 21.3 (postcertification communications with class members); § 21.32 (communications from class members);
§ 21.33 (communications among parties, counsel, and class members).
159. See MANUAL FOR COMPLEX LrrIGATION (4th ed.) supra note 99,

and cases
160.
161.
162.

cited therein.
See id.
See id. at §§ 21.3, 21.32, 21.33 and cases cited therein.
Id.

§§

21.12, 21.13, 21.14, 22.8
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A unique feature of class-action litigation, unlike ordinary litigation or
joinder cases, is the requirement that absent class members be provided
with notice in Rule 23(b)(3) class actions. 16 3 After December 1, 2003, the
federal class-action rule now also permits courts to direct "appropriate notice" to classes that a court may certify under Rule 23(b)(1) or (b)(2)."
Rule 23(e) requires courts to give notice to class members of proposed
class settlements. 6 5 In addition, the 2003 rule amendments added a new
subdivision that requires courts to provide class members an additional opfrom a class action after learning the terms
portunity to exclude themselves
1 66
settlement.
proposed
a
of
Taken collectively, the class-action rule's various notice provisions involve judges in supervising, reviewing, and approving notice to be sent to
absent class members at various stages of the progression of a class litigation. 16 7 To the extent that a state class-action rule adopts the features of
the federal 2003 amendments, these provisions considerably extend the
scope of the court's involvement in the notice problem. 1 68 This judicial
scrutiny entails reviewing the content and format of proposed notice, in
order to ensure that any proposed notice conforms to the constitutional
due process
and rule requirements for adequate and fair notice to class
169
members.
Judges now will be involved in reviewing proposed class notice at the
time the court certifies a class action under any of the Rule 23(b) provisions; in addition, judges will be involved in reviewing and approving class
notice again prior to a settlement fairness hearing. Finally, judges may be
involved in approving any final notice or claims forms that are sent to class
members after final judicial approval of a settlement.
Unlike ordinary litigation, where the parties may settle a case without
any judicial oversight, class-action litigation may not be compromised, settled, or dismissed without court approval.' 70 In class-action litigation, federal judges frequently become actively involved in working with the parties
to craft the terms and contours of class settlements.1 7 '
The 2003 amendments to Federal Rule 23(e) added a provision that
courts must conduct a hearing (called a "fairness hearing") prior to the
163. FED. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(3); see also FED. R. Civ. P. 23(c)(1)(b).
164. FED. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(1), (b)(2); see also FED. R. Civ. P. 23(c)(2)(A) (effective Dec. 1, 2003).
165. FED. R. Civ. P. 23(e)(1)(B).
166. FED. R. Civ. P. 23(e)(2).
167. See MANUAL FOR COMPLEX LITIGATION (4th ed) supra note 99, § 21.31 (notices from the

court to the class); § 21.633 (notice of fairness hearing); § 21.722 (notice of attorney fee awards).
168. Id.
169. See FED. R. Civ. P. 23(c)(2)(B) (setting forth specific requirements for the content and format of class notice); see also MANUAL FOR COMPLEX LITIGATION (4th ed.), supra note 99, § 21.31 (citing

cases construing and applying constitutional and rule-based standards for adequate notice in class-action context).

170. FED. R. Civ. P. 23(e).
171. See, e.g., Peter H. Shuck, The Role of Judges in Settling Complex Cases: The Agent Orange
Example, 53 U. CHI. L. REV. 337 (1986) (role of Judge Jack Weinstein, of the Eastern District of New
York, in crafting the Agent Orange class settlement).

MISSISSIPPI COLLEGE LAW REVIEW

[VOL. 24:217

approval of any proposed class settlement. 172 In addition, the 2003 amend-

ments to Rule 23(e) added a number of new provisions relating to the settlement of class actions,1 73 including a lengthy expanded Advisory
Committee Note intended to provide guidance to federal courts in conducting settlement fairness hearings.1 74 Fairness hearings, both historically
and currently, 7 5 tend to be elaborate evidentiary hearings in which the

settlement proponents carry the burden of demonstrating to the court that
the proposed settlement is fair, adequate, and reasonable. 1 76 Fairness hear-

ings may extend over several days, involve multiple witness testimonies,
and the production of voluminous documentary evidence in support of the
class settlement. The import of the expanded Rule 23(e) requirements relating to class settlements is to expand the due process supervisory duties of

the court, not to contract those responsibilities.
In addition, class-action settlements often tend to implicate another

entire universe of late-appearing actors, namely, objectors 77 and intervenors.178 As class-action litigation metamorphosizes into an operatic production, new actors appear from the stage wings to take center stage. The
judge's role is to orchestrate all these new actors: to rule on petitions for
intervention,' 79 and to determine whether and in what manner objectors

may present argument.' 80
There are at least three other ways in which judicial officers are intricately enmeshed in class-action litigation, in ways in which judges are not

involved in ordinary cases on their dockets. First, in ordinary litigation,
courts are not involved in setting or determining the fee arrangement between the attorney and client. In class-action litigation, however, the court
must approve class counsel's ultimate fee petition.' 8 1 Notice of proposed
attorney fee awards must be incorporated as part of notice to the class. Fee
petitions may be presented as part of a settlement fairness hearing. Alternatively, fee petition hearings often are free-standing hearings involving
witness testimony, expert testimony, and documentary proof. Federal Rule
172. FED. R. Civ. P. 23(e)(1)(C) (effective Dec. 1, 2003). Prior to the 2003 amendment, Rule 23
contained no requirement that courts conduct a hearing to approve a proposed class-action settlement.
173. FED. R. Civ. P. 23(e)(1)(c).
174. FED. R. Civ. P. 23(e) advisory committee's note (effective Dec. 1, 2003).
175. See, e.g., Georgine v. Amchem Prods., 157 F.R.D. 246 (E.D. Pa. 1993) (approving class settlement based on fairness hearing that involved eighteen days of testimony over five weeks with twentynine witnesses; the Georgine class settlement subsequently was overturned by both the Third Circuit
and the United States Supreme Court).
176.

MANUAL FOR COMPLEX LITIGATION (4th ed.) supra note 99, § 21.6 (settlements); § 22.9

(mass-tort settlements).
177. Id. § 21.643 (role of objectors in settlement). See generally Edward Brunet, Class Action
Objectors: Free Riders or Fairness Guarantors,2003 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 403 (2003) (role of objectors in
assuring fairness of class-action settlements).
178. See FED. R. Civ. P. 23(d)(4) (orders in the conduct of class actions, including the ability of
the court to issue orders imposing conditions on the representative parties or on intervenors); see also
FED. R. Civ. P. 24 (intervention).
179. FED. R. Civ. P. 23(d)(4), 24.
180. FED. R. Civ. P. 23(e)(4)(A), (B).; see also FED. R. Civ. P. 23(e) advisory committee note.
181. MANUAL FOR COMPLEX LITIGATION (4th ed.) supra note 99, § 21.7 (attorney fee awards);

§ 22.297 (awarding and allocating attorney fees in mass-tort class actions).
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of Civil Procedure 23, as amended in 2003, added a new subdivision
provid182

ing for court determination and approval of attorney fees.
Second, many courts retain continuing jurisdiction and supervisory authority over class actions, even after court approval of a class settlement.
Hence, many courts are involved in various aspects of post-settlement administration of the class claims.' 83 These actions may extend to oversight
of a claims facility, or supervision of claims- administration vendors. Indeed, some class actions may never go away, as the Agent Orange litigation

demonstrates, because a court may maintain continuing jurisdiction to entertain collateral attacks against the court's previous rulings
and settlement
1 84
approval, as occurred in the Agent Orange litigation.

Finally, class-action litigation, in common with most other types of
complex litigation, invariably involves the court with an array of judicial

surrogates such as magistrates, special masters, court-appointed expert witnesses, and other judicial adjuncts.185 While at first blush it might seem
that the purpose of employing judicial adjuncts is precisely to relieve the

courts of aspects of complex litigation, this ignores the reality that the court
must solicit and interview prospective adjuncts; in the case of special mas-

ters, must draft and approve the order of appointment that details the
scope and duties of the special master; must review and approve reports or
proposed orders; and must spend time and effort in coordinating proceed-

ings with the judicial adjuncts.
In summation, the core argument that class-action litigation is conducive to promoting judicial economy and efficiency is an argument that requires careful scrutiny. It may be true that judicial efficiency and economy
may be accomplished by aggregate disposition of claims. However, this
goal needs to be assessed against a realistic portrait of the myriad ways in
which judicial burdens are increased as a consequence of proceeding with
class litigation.

Class actions are not simply big joinder cases. Because class-action
litigation is representation litigation and is imbued with constitutional due
process concerns, the role of the court in over-seeing class litigation is constitutionally important. Constitutional considerations, rule requirements,
182. FED. R. Civ. P. 23(h) (effective Dec. 1, 2003 and attempting to codify existing various methodologies for determining class action attorney fees, including the lodestar method and the "percentage
of the common benefit fund" approach); see also FED. R. Civ. P. 23(h) advisory committee's note.
183. MANUAL FOR COMPLEX LrIGATION (4th ed.) supra note 99, § 21.66 (settlement
administration).
184. More than fifteen years after final approval of the Agent Orange settlement, Judge Weinstein
maintained continuing jurisdiction over any subsequent Agent Orange claims. In this capacity, the Stephenson challenges to the Agent Orangesettlement, which originated in Louisiana and New Jersey state
courts, were transferred to Judge Weinstein in the Eastern District of New York, for disposition. Under
this authority, Judge Weinstein denied the collateral attack (and the Veterans' claims) against the Agent
Orange settlement. Stephenson v. Dow Chemical Co., 273 F.3d 249, 251 (2d Cir. 2001), affid in part by
equally divided court, vacated in part, 539 U.S. 111 (2003), vacated by 346 F.3d 19 (2d Cir. 2003).
185. MANUAL FOR COMPLEX LITIGATION (4th ed.) supra note 99, § 21.644 (role of magistrate
judges, special masters, and other judicial adjuncts); see also FED. R. Civ. P. 53 (special masters).
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and class-action jurisprudence require the active and continuing involvement of judges in the development and resolution of class litigation.
Hence, the Mississippi rulemakers are well-reminded and well-cautioned
by the southern parable of Br'er Rabbit and the tar pit.
G.

Will Enactment of a State Class-Action Rule Enhance the Legal
Profession and the Quality of the Practice of Law
in Mississippi?

The previous portions of this article have suggested that the Mississippi rulemakers, in considering whether to promulgate a state class-action
rule, look to the interests of Mississippi's citizens, as well as to the interests
of its judiciary. Yet another appropriate constituency of a proposed state
class-action rule is the practicing bar. In this regard, then, the Mississippi
rulemakers should perhaps consider whether the enactment of a state classaction rule will enhance the legal profession and the quality of the practice
of law in Mississippi.
In evaluating this question, the rulemakers also might bear in mind
that the Mississippi bar already has class-action practitioners in Mississippi
federal courts. The pertinent question, then, may be: what value will be
added to the Mississippi legal profession by expanding the ability to pursue
class litigation in state courts?
It is relatively easy to forecast the benefits to the Mississippi bar, indeed to the entire Mississippi economy, by promulgating a state class-action rule. On the theory of "build it and they will come, '186 the enactment
of a state class-action rule undoubtedly will inspire the filing of many state
class actions. In turn, the litigation and settlement of Mississippi state class
actions will develop expertise in a segment of the profession specializing in
Mississippi state class actions. Mississippi practitioners will benefit from
enhanced fee recoveries from class-action settlements; local economies will
benefit from the increased revenues generated by the influx of out-of-state
attorneys defending Mississippi state class actions. As indicated above,
Mississippi citizens may or may not be benefited from class litigation on its
behalf.
The Mississippi rulemakers, however, should perhaps balance these
undoubtedly attractive prospects for state class-action practice against
other realities of class litigation: the darker, underside of the class-action
experience in some, but not all, jurisdictions with class-action rules.
First, and perhaps foremost, the Mississippi rulemakers should assess
whether in enacting a class-action rule, Mississippi instantaneously will
transform itself into a so-called "magnet forum" or "drive-by" jurisdiction
for class-action litigation.18 7 In class-action parlance, these are pejorative
descriptors to tar certain state venues that are reflexively pro-plaintiff,
186. FIELD OF DREAMS (Universal Studios 1989).
187. In the extreme form, also known as judicial "hell-holes" by certain segments of the defense
bar. See Behrens & Silverman, supra note 38 (discussion of so-called "hell-hole" jurisdictions).
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where courts indiscriminately certify any proposed class action either on
the pleadings or without rigorous analysis of class certification requirements. 188 In this scenario, class-action litigation is a thinly-veiled means to
accomplish settlement-blackmail, and drive-by certification is the quickest
and surest means to this end.
For the longest time, the entire Gulf South (Mississippi excluded) was
pejoratively labeled as one massive "drive-by" jurisdiction. 8 9 Although
this trend has been reversed or abated in Texas and Alabama in recent
years, 190 the Mississippi rulemakers perhaps might ask whether there is
substantial support to transform Mississippi into the Florida, Louisiana, or
Madison County (Illinois) of the South. In addition, whatever incremental
benefit class-action litigation redounds to local economies, such short-term
financial benefits need to be balanced against the costs to the general business climate within the state.1 91
Another consideration for the Mississippi bar is that although promulgation of a state class-action rule will generate new state class-action litigation, Mississippi attorneys may not be the attorneys who initiate, retain,
resolve, or primarily benefit from the new opportunities for pursuing Mississippi state class actions. In recent years the plaintiff's litigation bar has
been transformed into a highly stratified and hierarchical affair. 9 This is
especially true in complex litigation and class actions, where a few wellfinanced and highly experienced national law firms tend to dominate class1 93
action litigation, including state class-action litigation.
While the Mississippi plaintiff's bar may hope to "cash in" on a new
opportunity for prosecuting Mississippi state class actions, Mississippi attorneys may instead find themselves playing second chair as local counsel
to the various highly-reputed national plaintiffs' law firms that dominate
the major class-action litigation throughout the country. The possibility
that Mississippi attorneys will play second fiddle to out-of-state class counsel is further enhanced by the newly-created rule requirements relating to
appointment of class counsel, if Mississippi were to adopt a state class-action rule patterned on the federal rule.1 94
Thus, apart from those Mississippi attorneys who litigate federal class
actions, one might expect that class-action expertise among the Mississippi
188. Perhaps the most notorious of these venues is not in the Gulf southern states, but is Madison
County, Illinois.
189. See Linda S. Mullenix, Abandoning the Federal Class Action Ship: Is There Smoother Sailing
for Class Actions in Gulf Waters, 74 TUL. L. REV. 1709 (2000) (symposium on class actions in the Gulf
States; describing class-action certification in drive-by jurisdictions and then-recent reversal by Texas
Supreme Court).
190. Id.
191. See generally Behrens & Silverman, supra note 38.
192. See generally Herbert M. Kritzer, From Litigators of Ordinary Cases to Litigators of ExtraordinaryCases: Stratification of the Plaintiffs' Bar in the Twenty-First Century, 51 DEPAUL L. REV.
219, 227 (2001) (discussing the stratification within the plaintiffs' bar, and how a few large and wellfinanced law firms initiate, take over, or control most complex litigation).
193. Id.
194. See FED. R. Civ. P. 23(g).
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plaintiffs' bar to be somewhat thin (compared with other jurisdictions with
longstanding class-action practice). Although Mississippi attorneys might
file and develop a local class-action lawsuit, a court might reasonably rele-

gate the original Mississippi attorneys to the status of interim counsel,
pending formal appointment of more experienced national class counsel.
The problem of lack of state class-action expertise has implications for
the bench, as well. If Mississippi enacts a state class-action rule, there will
be Mississippi attorneys with at least some federal class-action experience

in the Mississippi federal courts. However, the same might not be true for
the Mississippi state judiciary, where class-action litigation will proceed on
a virtual tabula rasa: a Mississippi clean slate. Except for state judges with

prior private practice experience with class litigation, it may be reasonably
predicted that many if not most state judges will not have encountered a
class action in their entire judicial tenure.
In further evaluating whether a class-action rule will enhance the Mississippi legal profession, it is well worth considering that class-action litigation presents unique and sometimes unusual ethical challenges to the
attorneys representing classes of claimants.195 The ethical challenges of
class litigation have been well-documented and well-developed in the aca-

demic literature, judicial decisions, and bar grievance opinions. These myriad ethical challenges include solicitation of class representatives and class
members; 196 fee agreements and determination and allocation of attorney
fees;' 97 conflicts of interest; 198 inadequate representation;' 99 aggregate settlements; 20 0 negotiating objector buy-outs;20 1 and communications with
class members, 20 2 among many class-action problems. Should Mississippi
195. See generally Jack B. Weinstein, Ethical Dilemmas in Mass Tort Litigation, 88 Nw. U. L. REV.
469 (1994) (lengthy discussion of ethical dilemmas in mass-tort and other complex litigation); David
Hricik, The 1998 Mass Tort Symposium: Legal Ethical Issues at the Cutting Edge of Substantive and
ProceduralLaw, 17 REV. LITIG. 419 (1998).
196. See, e.g., Musselwhite v. State Bar of Texas, 786 S.W.2d 437 (Tex. App. 1990) (attorney sanctioned for improper solicitation of class clients); see generally Eric S. Roth, Confronting Solicitation of
Mass Disaster Victims, 26 GEO. L.J. 967 (1989).
197. See, e.g., In re "Agent Orange" Prod. Liab. Litig., 818 F.2d 216, 218 (2d Cir. 1987) (rejection
of court approval of fee arrangement among class-action attorneys); see also supra note 182 (discussion
of new Rule 23(h) provision for determining attorney fees in class litigation).
198. See supra note 104; see also Geoffrey P. Miller, Conflicts of Interest in Class Action Litigation:
An Inquiry into the Appropriate Standard, 2003 U. CHt. LEGAL F. 581 (2003).
199. See, e.g., Mekdeci v. Merrell Nat'l Labs., 711 F.2d 1510, 1522-23 (11th Cir. 1983) (challenge to
inadequate representation by counsel in original Bendectin lawsuit).
200. See generally Charles Silver & Lynn A. Baker, I Cut, You Choose: The Role of Plaintiffs'
Counsel in Allocating Settlement Proceeds, 84 VA. L. REV. 1465 (1998); cf Nancy J. Moore, The Case
Against Changing the Aggregate Settlement Rule in Mass Tort Lawsuits, 41 S. TEX. L. REV. 149 (1998).
201. See Brunet, supra note 177, at 429 (describing buyouts of objectors). Amended FED. R. Civ.
P. 23(e) now requires that proponents of a class-action settlement report to the court any "side deals"
negotiated and consummated as part of the settlement; presumably this provision is to expose so-called
objector buy-outs. See FED. R. Civ. P. 23(e)(2) ("The parties seeking approval of a settlement, voluntary dismissal, or compromise under Rule 23(e)(1) must file a statement identifying any agreement
made in connection with the proposed settlement, voluntary dismissal, or compromise.").
202. See supra note 158 (discussion of communications with class members); see also Nancy
Bowen, Restrictions on Communications by Class Action Parties and Attorneys, 1980 DUKE L.J. 360
(1980).
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enact a state class-action rule, its practicing attorneys will now confront an
array of novel legal issues not present in ordinary litigation or even complex joinder cases.
Another factor that the Mississippi rulemakers might consider is the
relative benefits of aggregative litigation, particularly representational litigation, when balanced against the litigant autonomy afforded in individual
or small-scale litigation. Class-action litigation alters the attorney-client relationship;2 3 in almost all class-action litigation the entire class of absent
class members has virtually no contact with the lawyer. Indeed, almost all
class members may not even know of the existence of a class action that is
being pursued on their behalf until the absent class member receives notice
of the action.
Class-action litigation, then, strips the client of supervision and control
of his or her own claims, relinquishes the claimant's active participation in
settlement negotiations, and may result in devaluation of claims that if pursued individually, or through some other alternative dispute resolution
mechanism, would achieve a more satisfactory result. This situation is exacerbated in those class actions where class counsel negotiates coupon settlements on behalf of absent class members. In the most extreme versions
of class litigation where there is little or no communication between class
counsel and the claimants they purport to represent, such class-action litigation has been pejoratively characterized as "lawyer-driven" litigation.
Hence, the Mississippi rulemakers might evaluate the costs to the attorneyclient relationship in allowing class actions as a procedural means for dispute resolution.
In assessing whether the practice of law will be enhanced by the introduction of a state class-action rule, the Mississippi rulemakers also ought to
consider that class-action litigation engenders and supports an entire array
of cottage-industry satellites to class litigation. Many of these satellite businesses may already be present in Mississippi as a result of the complex
cases litigated pursuant to Rule 20, but if not already present, the enactment of a class-action rule will bring these litigation adjuncts to the state.
These include professional notice vendors, special masters, expert witnesses, and claims administrators.
Finally, the introduction of a state class-action rule also inevitably will
bring with it an invasion of out-of-state settlement objectors, °4 whose appearance in Mississippi state courts may strain civility among the practicing
bar. Many state class actions have multi-state or national reach by virtue of
the class definition; such class actions inspire objections from out-of-state
counsel who wish to preserve parallel duplicative class litigation in other

203. See, e.g., Roger H. Transgrud, Mass Trials in Mass Tort Cases: A Dissent, 1989 U. ILL. L. REV.
69 (1985) (arguing against aggregative procedures, including class actions, on the grounds that such
procedures compromise litigant autonomy).
204. See supra note 177 (discussion of objectors).
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states. Mississippi attorneys and jurists may now expect to engage in interstate dueling with professional colleagues over the prosecution and settlement of parallel duplicative class actions.
H.

Will Enactment of a Mississippi State Class-Action Rule be Subverted
by CongressionalEnactment of the Class Action FairnessAct?
(Or, Closing the Barn Door After the Horse is Out)

It is, of course, ironic that the Mississippi rulemakers are considering
promulgation of a state class-action rule against the backdrop of federal
Congressional legislation specifically designed to curb state class-action litigation. On February 18, 2005, President Bush signed into law the Class
Action Fairness Act,2 °5 which legislation provides both original and removal jurisdiction for state class actions. Mississippi rulemakers perhaps
should consider, then, the purpose and utility of a state class-action rule
where federal legislation may substantially eviscerate the ability to pursue
state class-action litigation anywhere in the United States.
The Act represents one of the most sweeping legislative initiatives relating to class-action litigation since the amendment of Federal Rule of
Civil Procedure 23 in 1966.206 The Senate passed the Act by a vote of
72-26, and the House by a vote of 279-149.
Versions of this legislation have been pending in Congress for several
years. The House passed similar bills on several occasions, only to see the
legislation languish in the Senate. After the November 2004 election, Congress acted quickly to enact the Act when Republicans secured a Senate
majority and House Republicans agreed to accept the Senate version.
The Act is a complex statute that contains provisions addressing: (1)
original federal court jurisdiction over class-action lawsuits; (2) removal of
state class actions into federal court; (3) class-action settlements, including
notice provisions; (4) interlocutory appeal of remand decisions; (5) other
non-class "mass actions;" (6) reporting requirements; and (7) effective
date.
The Act applies to any civil action commenced on or after the date of
its enactment. The Act is not retroactive and therefore has no applicability
to class actions pending or filed before February 18, 2005.
The Act has incorrectly been characterized as a removal statute intended to move all state class actions into federal court. Primarily, the Act
essentially is a modification of federal statutes relating to federal court
original diversity jurisdiction. The Act amends the federal diversity statute,
28 U.S.C. § 1332. It provides federal courts with original diversity jurisdiction over any class action when: (1) the aggregate amount in controversy
205. Class Action Fairness Act of 2005, Pub. L. 109-2, 118 Stat. 4 (2005).
206. The following sections are adapted from Linda S. Mullenix & Paul D. Rheingold, Impact of
the Class Action FairnessLaw, N.Y.L.J., Mar. 3, 2005, at 5.
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exceeds $5 million (exclusive of interests and costs); (2) the number of putative class members is at least 100; and (3) any class member is a citizen of
a state or foreign country different than any defendant.
This amendment achieves two significant modifications of existing federal court diversity jurisdiction. First, the statute permits aggregation of
class damages, effectively overruling the Supreme Court's non-aggregation
decision in Zahn v. InternationalPaper Co. 20 7 Second, the statute provides
for "minimal diversity" among the parties, effectively eliminating the
"complete diversity" requirement that exists for all other federal diversity
cases. The net effect is to expand federal court jurisdiction for large scale,
multistate class actions and to eliminate previous impediments to federal
jurisdiction over such class actions. The statute provides for both
mandatory and discretionary exercise of federal jurisdiction for class actions that meet the threshold requirements of minimal diversity and $5 million aggregate damages.
The statute creates two types of mandatory jurisdiction: circumstances
when a court may not decline class-action jurisdiction, and other circumstances when a court must decline jurisdiction. First, a federal court may
not decline to exercise jurisdiction if 1/3 or fewer of proposed class members are citizens of the state in which the plaintiffs filed the original action.
However, a federal court must decline to exercise jurisdiction: (1) if
more than two-thirds of class members are citizens of the state in which the
action was originally filed; (2) at least one defendant is a citizen of the state
in which the action was originally filed, class members are seeking significant relief from this defendant, and the defendant's alleged conduct forms
a significant basis for the plaintiffs' claims; (3) the principal injuries were
incurred in the state where the action originally was filed; and (4) in three
prior years, the same claimants have not asserted the same or similar claims
against the defendants. In addition, a federal court must decline jurisdiction if two-thirds or more of class claimants, and the "primary" defendants,
are citizens of the state in which the action originally was filed.
The Act vests discretion to decline federal court jurisdiction even
when the proposed class action satisfies the minimal diversity and amountin-controversy requirements. Thus, if greater than one-third but less than
two-thirds of class members and the "primary defendants" are citizens of
the state in which the case was filed, the court may decline jurisdiction.
The court is to consider whether yielding jurisdiction would be "in the interests of justice ... looking at the totality of the circumstances."
Several factors may guide this discretionary evaluation, including
whether: (1) the claims involve matters of national or interstate interest; (2)
the claims will be governed by state law in which the action originally was
filed, or by the laws of other states; (3) the plaintiffs have artfully pleaded
the case to avoid federal jurisdiction; (4) the forum has a nexus with class
members, the defendants, and the harms alleged; (5) whether the numbers
207. 414 U.S. 291 (1973).
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of class members is substantially larger from the state in which the action
was originally filed than from any other state, or whether claimants are
dispersed among many states; and (6) during three years prior to filing the
class action, one or more same or similar class actions were filed on behalf
of the same or similar claimants.
The Act works with the federal removal statutes to permit class actions
filed in state court to be removed into federal court. The federal removal
statutes are set forth at 28 U.S.C. §§ 1441-1452. The Act adds a new removal provision, 28 U.S.C. § 1453, that interacts with the existing removal
provisions.
The new removal provision modifies removal procedures in several respects. Existing diversity cases must be removed to federal court within one
year.20 8 Under the Act, class actions are exempt from this deadline. Under
existing removal provisions, a case may not be removed if any defendant is
a citizen of the state in which the action is brought. The Act modifies this
restriction; class actions may be removed regardless of whether any defendant is a citizen of the state in which the class action was brought. Lastly,
under existing removal procedures, all defendants must consent to a removal petition. The Act eliminates this restriction; state class actions may
20 9
be removed without the consent of all the defendants.
The Act also contains provisions permitting removal for "mass actions" filed in state court. These are not special provisions for mass-tort
cases, despite the confusing label. Rather, these provisions are intended to
encompass states such as Mississippi, which does not have a state classaction rule, but permits massive joinder of claims under its state joinder
rule. The Act defines a mass action as "civil actions in which 100 or more
plaintiffs bring suit jointly for monetary damages based on claims that involve common questions of law or fact."
These state joinder lawsuits are subject to the Act's removal provisions. However, in "mass action" lawsuits, each plaintiff must individually
satisfy the $75,000 amount-in-controversy requirement for jurisdiction
under 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a).
Mass action cases will not include cases where (1) all claims arise in
the filing state and any injuries were suffered in that state or a contiguous
state; (2) the defendant joined the claims; (3) the claims are asserted on
behalf of the public pursuant to a state statute; and (4) the claims have
been consolidated solely for coordinated pre-trial proceedings.
208. See 28 U.S.C. § 1446(b).
209. The Act also contains provisions relating to immediate interlocutory review of grant or denial
of remand petitions. Under the current removal statutes, an order remanding a case to state court is
not reviewable. 28 U.S.C. § 1447(d). The Act permits accelerated, discretionary review of a district
court's order granting or denying a motion to remand. This appeal must be brought "not less than 7
days after entry of the order." The appellate courts have discretion to entertain the appeal; the statute
does not provide standards for exercise of this discretion.
If an appellate court accepts discretionary review, it must complete its review no later than 60 days
after the date the appeal was filed. However, if the parties agree, the appellate court may grant a 60
day extension, or a 10 day extension "for good cause shown and in the interests of justice."
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If the defendants remove a mass action to federal court, then the mass
action may not be transferred to federal MDL proceedings unless a majority of plaintiffs request MDL treatment.
The Act's preamble sections recite the benefits of class-action litigation as well as the burdens and abuses of class litigation. In order to curb
the most egregious excesses of class settlements, the Act provides provisions relating to settlements. For example, the Act provides that settlements may not pay larger awards to some class members because they live
in closer proximity to the court where the litigation was filed.
Most prominently, the Act provides that in coupon settlements, the
attorneys' fee award is to be based on the value to class members of coupons that class members actually redeemed. If a portion of a coupon settlement recovery is not used to determine fees, then the fee award is to be
based on time that class counsel reasonably expended.
The Act provides for new notice provisions. The Act requires that
when a proposed settlement is filed in court, each defendant must notify
the appropriate state and federal officials of each state in which class members reside of the proposed settlement. The notice must include information about the complaint, proposed settlement, class notice, proposed
judgment, and names of class members if feasible.
A federal court may not finally approve a class settlement earlier than
90 days after state and federal officials are notified. If notice to government officials is not provided, then a class member may choose not to be
bound by any settlement agreement or consent decree.
At least some implications of the Class Action Fairness Act are reasonably foreseeable.2 1 ° The Act most likely will result in large-scale multistate and national class actions being removed into the federal system.
Alternatively, the plaintiffs' bar may regroup and decide to file more class
actions initially in federal courts, in plaintiff-friendly jurisdictions such as
the Second and Ninth Circuits. Small-scale, localized class actions will remain in state court.
The Mississippi rulemakers, then, need to consider the extent to which
it makes sense to promulgate a class-action rule in the shadow of the Class
210. In addition to the obvious implication that more state-based class actions will now be subject
to removal into federal court, it also is reasonably foreseeable that we are about to embark on at least a
decade of collateral litigation arising from appellate review of remand orders. Because the statute does
not provide standards for discretionary review, appellate courts will now embark on delineating such
standards. This exercise probably will replicate the federal court experience in articulating standards
for discretionary interlocutory review of class certification orders under Rule 23(f) FED. R. Civ. P.
(amended in 1998).
Second, federal courts that do accept discretionary review of remand orders will now have to construe the often problematic language of the statutory provisions to determine whether federal jurisdiction was mandatory or discretionary. Appellate courts will now be enmeshed in thorny statutory
construction problems, such as determining how many members comprise a proposed class (applying
the difficult one-third and two-thirds formulas), as well as location of class members. Courts will have
to parse new terms such as "primary defendants." This exercise will probably replicate the federal
court experience with parsing Congress's supplement jurisdiction statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1367 (enacted in
1990, and still unsettled law).
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Action Fairness Act. Pursuant to the Act's removal provisions, almost all
attempted multi-state or nationwide class actions filed under a new Mississippi state class-action rule would be subject to removal into federal court.
In these instances, Mississippi will be no better or worse off than its current
class-action situation. Under the Act's local carve-out provisions, however,
purely localized Mississippi class actions would remain in state court.
Hence, in light of this, it makes sense to assess the incidence of purely
localized class-action litigation that might be affected by the new federal
legislation.
On the other hand, if Mississippi now chooses not to promulgate a
state class-action rule, many if not most of its "big joinder" mass actions
will be subject to the Act's special removal provisions. In either instance
(class action or mass action), the Class Action Fairness Act will affect
large-scale litigation in Mississippi state courts.
L

Other Federalism Concerns: Will Vermont Recognize Mississippi
Class-Action Settlements?

While it may be of remote or subsidiary concern, another problem that
Mississippi rulemakers need to be cognizant of is the potential for a decline
in inter-system comity engendered by state class-action litigation. Framed
differently, this problem asks the rulemakers to consider the long-arm effects of Mississippi state class-action settlements, whether Mississippi can
exert personal jurisdiction over non-residents, and whether Mississippi
courts can adjudicate and resolve the class claims of citizens of other states.
In short, the resolution of multistate and national class actions in state
court exposes those state courts to potential Full Faith and Credit as well as
collateral attack by other states.
The required reading on this regard is the illustrative case of State of
Vermont v. Homeside Lending."a' The Homeside Lending litigation has
been characterized as a poster-child for class-action abuse; the class-action
settlement was well-publicized in the media. The underlying class litigation
arose out of claims relating to fees in mortgage lending practices by various
northeastern banks. 2 12 The litigation eventually was resolved in a Rule
23(b)(3) nationwide, opt-out class-action settlement, approved by the Alabama state courts. Pursuant to the requirements of Rule 23(b)(3), notice of
the class-action settlement, the terms of the settlement, and attorneys fees
213
was sent to class claimants across the country.
Subsequently, various Vermont citizens with mortgage escrow accounts complained to their state attorney general when the citizens discovered that their escrow accounts were being debited to pay for their share of
attorney fees in the Alabama class settlement.2 1 4 The Vermont attorney
211.
212.
213.
214.

826 A.2d 997 (Vt. 2003).
Id. at 999.
Id. at 1000.
Id. at 999.
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general, acting parens patrie on behalf of Vermont residents, then collaterally attacked the Alabama class settlement on the grounds that the settlement violated the due process rights of Vermont citizens.21 5 The settlement
proponents defended the Alabama settlement, which had been approved
as fair, adequate and reasonable after a fairness hearing.2 1 6
The Vermont Supreme Court eventually held that the Alabama settlement violated the due process rights of Vermont citizens, and voided the
settlement as to Vermont residents.2 17 Notwithstanding the fact that the
settlement was a Rule 23(b)(3) opt-out class, the Vermont Supreme Court
held that the Alabama courts could not exert personal jurisdiction over
Vermont citizens in a class-action settlement. 2 18 The Vermont Supreme
Court further concluded that the class-action notice was defective and insufficient to inform Vermont residents of the terms of the settlement, the
methodology by which attorneys' fees were to be calculated, and that inclusion in the class might result in class members 219
receiving no benefit from the
class action, but only the imposition of costs.
The Homeside Lending case, then, presents an object lesson in the perils of state court overreaching in negotiating and approving class-action settlements which adjudicate the rights of citizens of other states. Even
though the Alabama court purportedly attempted to comply with due process protections for non-resident class members, the Vermont court struck
down the settlement in order to protect its own citizens.
State class litigation inevitably inspires either multi-state or national
litigation as an original matter, or at settlement stages. Indeed, a common
pattern in class litigation is for plaintiffs' counsel to forum-shop a failed
federal class action, and then to refile a copy-cat action in a favorable state
venue. In the settlement arena, the abandonment of a failed federal class
settlement in favor of a more favorable state forum is known as a "reverse
auction" or a "race to the bottom." Again, the Gulf States have been favored forums for reverse auction settlements, and there are numerous examples of this phenomenon.2 2 °
215. Id.
216. Id. at 1004.
217. Id. at 1020.
218. Id.
219. Id. at 1009-10.
220. Most recently the BridgestonelFirestonelitigation followed this well-know pattern. The original Bridgestone/Firestoneclass litigation was filed in federal court in Indiana; the Indiana federal court
approved a nationwide class certification. In re Bridgestone/Firestone, Inc. ATX ATX 11 & Wilderness
Tires Prods. Liab. Litig., 205 F.R.D. 503, 516 (2001). On appeal, the Seventh Circuit reversed the
nationwide class certification and warned that the plaintiffs could not seek nationwide class certification
of the same action in state courts. In re Bridgestone/Firestone, Inc., Tires Prods. Liab. Litig., 288 F.3d
1012, 1018-19 (2002). The plaintiffs attorneys then regrouped and did precisely that; they sought certification of a nationwide class of Bridgestone/Firestoneclaimants in state court. The defendants then
appealed to the Seventh Circuit again, requesting that the court issue an injunction restraining the state
class action, based on the court's prior order. The Seventh Circuit issued another decision restraining
the state court from certifying a nationwide class action. In re Bridgestone/Firestone, Tire Prods. Liab.
Litig., 333 F.3d 763, 769 (2003). The Bridgestone/Firestonesaga was not complete, however; because
the parties all adjourned to Texas where they negotiated a settlement, which the Texas state court
approved. Shields v. Bridgestone/Firestone,2004 WL 546883 (Tex. March 12, 2004).
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If Mississippi enacts a state class-action rule, the rulemakers should at
least be aware that this opens the state to become a reverse-auction jurisdiction, with the attendant problems of potential collateral attack by a sister-state.
J.

What Model of a Class-Action Rule Should Mississippi Adopt?
Whither Mississippi State Class-Action Jurisprudence?

Finally, the Mississippi rulemakers, should they decide to promulgate a
class-action rule, will need to consider the drafting and content of such a
rule. 2 21 Because my colleague Professor Klonoff has been assigned the
task of surveying the array of issues that the rulemakers need to consider in
drafting a state class-action rule, I will not enumerate those considerations.
Instead, at the threshold, the Mississippi rulemakers should at least be
aware that the various state class-action rules are not the same across all
states.2 2 2 Consistent with the glorious variety inspired by federalism, state
class-action rules are as varied as the states. Hence, some states have
modeled their class-action rules on Federal Rule 23; other states have
adopted the Uniform Law Commissioner's Model Class Action Rule; while
other states have adopted neither model but instead have promulgated an
idiosyncratic rule for state practice and procedure.2 23 Even among the
states that have patterned their state class-action rule on the federal rule,
significant differences exist. For example, the Oregon class-action rule has
no predominance requirement; 2 24 the California class-action rule defines a
class in terms of a "community of interest"; 225 the Florida class-action rule
has specific provisions relating to condominiums; 226 and the Texas classaction rule caps attorney fees and relates fees in coupon cases to the value
of the coupons.2 27
If the Mississippi rulemakers embark on the process of drafting a classaction rule, the rulemakers will either choose to model such a rule on Federal Rule 23, or some other state class-action rule. The sheer task of reviewing and considering forty-nine other state class-action rules is
daunting, although certainly educational. Professor Klonoff instead suggests the default approach, which is to pattern the Mississippi rule on the
federal rule.
However, if the Mississippi rulemakers do decide to pattern a state
class-action rule after the current federal Rule 23, they should do so with
221. See Klonoff, supra note 44.
222. See LINDA S. MULLENIX, STATE
with annual updates).
223. Id.
224.

CLASS ACTION: PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE §

1 (CCH 2000

LINDA S. MULLENIX, STATE CLASS ACTION PRACTICE: Oregon at § 1.01 (text of state class-

action rule).
225.

LINDA S. MULLENIX, STATE CLAss ACTION PRACTICE: California at § 1.01 (text of state

class-action rule).
226. LINDA S. MULLENIX, STATE CLASS ACTION PRACTICE: Florida at § 1.01 (text of state classaction rule).
227. LINDA S. MULLENIX, STATE CLASS ACTION PRACTICE: Texas at § 1.01 (text of state class-

action rule).
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the knowledge that the Advisory Committee on Civil Rules spent approximately twelve years, from 1991 through 2003, debating proposed amendments to the 1966 version of the federal rule. Consequently, there is an
enormous body of draft proposals, commentary, debate, and consideration
of various proposals to amend the federal class-action rule. And, in light of
the fact that Professor Klonoff commends some of those rejected proposals
for incorporation in a Mississippi state rule, it seems worth visiting those
materials for background information to consider those same debates.
Finally, apart from a conversation about the content of a possible
class-action rule, the Mississippi rulemakers might reflect on the arch of
class-action experience in at least two sister-Gulf-south states. Until 2000,
both Alabama and Texas were widely reputed to be plaintiff-favoring
drive-by class certification states. For various reasons, both states, as a consequence of rulings from their respective state Supreme Courts, have now
severely limited class-action practice in those venues. When combined
with the federal Class Action Fairness Act, state class actions in both jurisdictions will be considerably cabined in the future. The question remains,
then, whether Mississippi, if it enacts a state class-action rule, will learn
from the jurisprudence of its neighboring states, or will traverse an inevitable arch from drive-by to bye-bye to state class-action litigation.
V.

CONCLUSION

The Mississippi rulemakers have an enormous task, with enormous
consequences, on their rulemaking agenda. Without advocating for or
against promulgation of a state class-action rule, it is hoped that the
rulemakers will engage in a spirited investigation and evaluation of the
benefits and burdens experienced as a consequence of a state class-action
rule. This article has attempted to set forth at least ten considerations the
rulemakers might draw into any conversation about enacting a class-action
rule. These do not include consideration of the fact that Mississippi remains the lone quirky state without a class-action rule; quirkiness alone
seems insufficient justification to join the Union.
There is a vast array of state class-action experience from which to
draw both positive and negative lessons regarding state class-action practice. One hopes the rulemakers balance rhetorical arguments with empirical facts and evidence. In the end, Mississippi rulemakers should be
reasonably confident that there is a compelling need for a state class-action
rule; that a class-action rule will better protect Mississippi citizens; that a
class-action rule will not additionally burden the judiciary; and that a classaction practice will enhance the practice of law in Mississippi. If so convinced, then the task for the rulemakers is equally daunting: to begin the
process of crafting such a rule.

